Recognition and social freedom
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885119871856 |
| Date | 01 January 2022 |
| Published date | 01 January 2022 |
| Author | Paddy McQueen |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article EJPT
Recognition and
social freedom
Paddy McQueen
Swansea University, UK
Abstract
In this article I describe and defend an account of social freedom grounded in inter-
subjective recognition. I term this the ‘normative authorisation’ account. It holds that a
person enjoys social freedom if she is recognised as a discursive equal able to engage in
justificatory dialogue with other social agents about the appropriateness of her reasons
for action. I contrast this with Axel Honneth’s theory of social freedom, which I term
the ‘self-realisation’ account. According to this view, the affirmative recognition of
others is necessary for obtaining a positive relation-to-self and hence freedom. I identify
several problems with this account, which challenge the connection Honneth draws
between social recognition and freedom. I show how the normative authorisation
account avoids these problems and captures some basic features of our everyday,
normative interactions. Finally, I suggest that the account fits well with recent work
on epistemic injustice. Specifically, it shows that securing the social conditions of
freedom requires ensuring epistemically-just social relations. Thus, the normative
authorisation account is an explanatorily powerful, inclusive theory of social freedom
that fits well with wider accounts of justice and freedom. Thus, it represents the most
promising way of understanding social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition.
Keywords
Axel Honneth, recognition, relational autonomy, Robert Pippin, social freedom
Corresponding author:
Paddy McQueen, Political and Cultural Studies, Swansea University,JC029, James Callaghan Building, Singleton
Campus, Swansea, SA2 8PP, UK.
Email: paddy.mcqueen@swansea.ac.uk
European Journal of Political Theory
!The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885119871856
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2022, Vol. 21(1) 89*–110
Introduction
The belief that freedom has an irreducibly social dimension has a long history,
going back to at least Rousseau and developed by the likes of Marx and Arendt.
To claim that freedom has a ‘social’ dimension is to argue that a person’s social
environment must be configured in a specific way for her to be free.
1
However,
there is disagreement about what the freedom-constituting social conditions are.
2
One view is that they are primarily recognitive. As both Fichte and Hegel argued,
in order to be free, social agents must mutually recognise one another. The aim of
this article is to establish what form(s) of recognition we need to be free and why.
To achieve this, I examine the work of Axel Honneth, who has produced one of
the most extensive and influential contemporary discussions of social freedom. He
constructs what I term a ‘self-realisation’ account of social freedom (first section).
This holds that the free agent is one who has a sufficiently positive, undamaged
relation-to-self, which can be obtained only through the affirmative attitudes of
others. Despite its many insights, I argue that ultimately it fails to provide an
adequate conceptualisation of the freedom-recognition relationship (second sec-
tion). The main issue is that the self-realisation account is too focused on, and
reliant upon, a psychological, developmental account of the free subject. I thus
develop a ‘normative authorisation’ account as a more plausible way of under-
standing social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition (third section).
According to this model, a person is free if she is recognised as a discursive
equal able to engage in justificatory dialogue with other social agents about the
appropriateness of her reasons for action. In other words, we are free if we can
discourse critically about our practical agency. This requires that we recognise one
another as having the status of free and rational beings (i.e. discursive equals).
Importantly, this account eschews the focus on psychological development
and self-realisation that underpins Honneth’s model. To substantiate it, I draw
from Robert Pippin’s neo-Hegelian theory of freedom and recent work on
relational autonomy.
I conclude by offering some reasons in support of the normative authorisation
account (fourth section). First, I show why it is not vulnerable to the concerns
I raise about Honneth’s account. I then defend it against the criticisms that it is too
abstract and demanding. To the contrary, I show that it captures a basic feature of
our everyday, normative interactions. Next, I argue that it can make good sense of
the connection between self-worth and being autonomous. Hence, it can incorpo-
rate valuable features of Honneth’s theory whilst avoiding its difficulties. Finally,
I suggest that it fits well with the concept of epistemic justice, which provides it
with an important theoretical advantage over the self-realisation account. In sum,
the normative authorisation account is an explanatorily powerful, inclusive theory
of social freedom that is built around key elements of our social relationships as
normative, rational beings and which fits well with wider accounts of justice and
freedom.
3
Thus, I argue that it represents the most promising way of understand-
ing social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition.
90 European Journal of Political Theory 21(1)
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