Reconsidering the settlement of civil conflict
| Date | 01 June 2018 |
| Published date | 01 June 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891118779281 |
| Author | Yuichi Kubota |
| Subject Matter | Editorial |
Editorial
Reconsidering the settlement
of civil conflict: Introduction
to the special issue
Yuichi Kubota
Faculty of International Studies and Regional Development, University of Niigata
Prefecture, Japan
Abstract
The settlement of civil conflict is highly relevant to both policy agendas and academic research. It is
often difficult to bring to the negotiation table conflict parties who have long harbored hostility
towards each other during the conflict. Even if the parties come to negotiation, it is often an
arduous task to reach an agreement because the post-conflict embarkation comes with political
uncertainty for the future. This special issue is aimed at addressing civil-conflict settlement from
two different angles. First, it attempts to understand the requisite conditions for the successful
settlement of armed civil conflicts. Second, it has a particular interest in the post-conflict design of
political institutions. The academic contribution of the articles lies in theoretical advancement as it
applies to the settlement of civil conflict. Each contribution adds a nuanced understanding of civil-
conflict settlement to the relevant literature. The articles provide insight into the successful
conditions of conflict settlement and post-conflict institutional design, such as power-sharing and
the management of resources.
Keywords
bargaining model, civil-conflict settlement, commitment problems
Given their enormous impact on societal development and prosperity, armed civil conflicts have
always been one of the most worrisome problems that we are presented with. Although a variety of
actors have put a great deal of effort into preventing and containing conflicts, a large number of
violent incidents have been recorded. Once a conflict erupts, what we need to consider and then
implement is how to manage and settle the dispute and, at its end, prevent recurrence. However,
human history shows that this is easier said than done. Assume a case of prolonged conflict where
negotiation is left as the only option for a feasible way of settlement. It is often difficult to bring to
the negotiation table conflict parties who have long harbored hostility towards each other during
the conflict. Furthermore, the parties may have no incentive to terminate the conflict if they are
benefitting from the status quo or even the continuation of fighting. Even if the parties come to
negotiation, it is often an arduous task to reach an agreement because the post-conflict embarkation
comes with political uncertainty for the future.
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2018, Vol. 3(2) 105–108
ªThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891118779281
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