Reconstruction in East Timor
| DOI | 10.1111/j.2041-9066.2010.00041.x |
| Published date | 01 December 2010 |
| Author | Paul Hainsworth |
| Date | 01 December 2010 |
| Subject Matter | From the Front Line |
Indonesian pressure, the early release and
pardon of some individuals convicted of
serious human rights violations has further
muddied the waters.
A more significant and engaging process
and institution took the form of the setting
up of the Commission for Reception, Truth
and Reconciliation (CAVR). The CAVR was
set up to establish the truth about human
rights violations that took place in Timor-
Leste during the years 1974–99. In 2005, its
final report, entitled Chega! (Enough!), found
that at least 102,800 Timorese died as a direct
result of the conflict. Many others were sub-
jected to torture, sexual violence, arbitrary
detention and enforced disappearances.
In addition to the CAVR, in 2004 the
Timorese and Indonesian governments –
in a process of reconciliation on high and
closure seeking all round – set up a further
institution, the bilateral Commission for
Truth and Friendship (CTF). But the CTF
was not welcomed by the international
community or civil society and victims’
groups in East Timor because of its narrow
and limited focus.
The UN refused to co-operate with the
CTF, which was viewed widely as an at-
tempt to scupper the justice-seeking process
and to bring it to premature closure. The
CTF’s final report found the Indonesian
armed forces and militia guilty of crimes
against humanity but, as yet, nothing tan-
gible has come of this.
Challenges of Reconciliation
It is not surprising, then, that human rights
organisations at home and abroad have
called for the setting up of an International
Criminal Tribunal to pursue justice for vic-
tims in East Timor. However, this measure
Reconstruction in East Timor
With a population of just 1.2 mil-
lion and territory of only 15,000
square kilometres, East Timor is
one of the United Nations’ smallest and
newest members. Also known as Timor-
Leste, this South-East Asian state joined
the UN in 2002. Prior to that, it had been
ruled by Portugal since the early 16th cen-
tury and then, following the implosion of
the Portuguese empire in the mid-1970s,
was invaded and occupied by neighbouring
Indonesia in 1975.
Twenty-five years of Indonesian rule was
nasty, brutish and not so short for the indig-
enous people of the half-island. Finally, amid
economic and other difficulties at home and
widespread opposition in East Timor and be-
yond, the Indonesian state agreed to usher
in the 1999 constitutional referendum.
The outcome was an overwhelming vote
of approval for self-determination but pro-
Indonesian forces on the ground greeted
it with a scorched earth policy which left
many people dead and much of the Timor-
ese infrastructure in ruins. Unsurprisingly,
then, the emergence of an independent and
sovereign state has been something of a bit-
ter dawn for East Timor.
In these circumstances, post-occupation
reconstruction and development has been
challenging for the fledgling nation state.
One of the key concerns has been trying to
come to terms with the past while looking
to a more prosperous and peaceful future.
The search for truth, justice and recon-
ciliation has figured prominently in the
transition. The initial mechanisms for this
were the Ad Hoc Human Rights Tribunal
in Jakarta and the UN-backed Special Panel
for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste. Yet these
processes have yielded scant results, with
the main suspects at large and untroubled
on Indonesian soil. Moreover, under some
Since gaining independence in 1999, the tiny South-East Asian state of East Timor has struggled to emerge
from the shadows of the bloody Indonesian occupation. Post-conflict reconstruction has been problematic but
Timor-Leste has reasons to look to the future, Paul Hainsworth reports.
does not have the support of the key politi-
cal forces in Timor-Leste (who are keen to
prioritise good relations with neighbouring
Indonesia), or the engagement of the UN
to back it strongly enough. What is at stake
here is a difference between the political
elites’ perception of what is viable and
desirable and that of others who point to
unfinished business in the sphere of justice
and human rights.
Nevertheless, in December 2009 a sig-
nificant development did take place when
a parliamentary resolution on the establish-
ment of a follow-up mechanism to CAVR/
CTF was passed. Amnesty International’s
2010 Annual Report neatly summed up the
picture on the human rights front in East
Timor:
Impunity persisted for grave human rights
violations committed during Timor-Leste’s
1999 independence referendum and the
previous 24 years of Indonesian occupation.
The judicial system remained weak and ac-
cess to justice was limited. The police and
security forces continued to use unneces-
sary and excessive force. Levels of domestic
violence remained high.
Given the legacy of the past and the difficult
beginnings for a sovereign East Timor, the
political leaders and others, including the
United Nations, have been keen to build
a secure and peaceful society in the terri-
tory. The UN’s administrative presence in
one form or another has been a feature of
Timor-Leste since 1999 and the mandate of
the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
was renewed for another year in February
2010.
Probably the most serious and signifi-
cant threat to the stability of the nascent
regime took place in 2006. Following the
From the Front Line
96 Political Insight
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