Redfern v. Dunlop Rubber Australia Limited1
| Author | T. J. Higgins |
| DOI | 10.1177/0067205X6500100211 |
| Published date | 01 June 1965 |
| Date | 01 June 1965 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
332 Federal Law Review [VOLUME 1
However, notwithstanding
that
the Ceylonese Courts have referred
to Australian authority, they do not seem to have fully thought
out
the
problems involved in the Australian cases and have
not
expressly
adopted the Boilermakers' Case classification-that is, there does
not
seem to be any rule that only 'judicial officers' may exercise judicial
power and that a ' judicial officer' is
not
to exercise powers
or
functions
other than judicial power. Therefore,
it
is
not
clear the Tribunal
would be validly appointed in an analogous situation in the federal
sphere in Australia.
J.
R.
COLQUHOUN
REDFERN
v.
DUNLOP
RUBBER AUSTRALIA LIMITED1
Constitutional
law-Trade
and commerce power-Restrictive trade practices
-Validity
of
Australian Industries Preservation
Act-Extent
of
Commonwealth power.
This was
an
action for treble damages under section
11
(1)2
of
the
Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906-1950 (Cth).
The plaintiffs were engaged in the business
of
buying, selling and
dealing in motor and cycle tyres and tubes and alleged that the defen-
dants who were manufacturers
of
tyres and tubes for sale throughout
Australia had either entered into acontract
or
combined among them-
selves with respect
to
the distribution, sale and delivery
of
tyres and
tubes so
that
prices and terms
of
sale to dealers were fixed. The effect
of
this,
it
was alleged, was arestraint on trade and commerce among
the States. Damages were claimed by the plaintiffs in respect
of
their
inability to obtain tyres
at
wholesale prices because
of
this price fixing
arrangement.
The defendants demurred
to
the statement
of
claim and submitted
that
sections 43and
11
(I)
of
the Australian Industries Preservation Act
were invalid,
not
being laws with respect to trade and commerce with
other countries and among the States.
The High Court rejected this argument and over-ruled the demurrer.
Taylor J. agreed in rejecting the constitutional objection raised by the
defendants
but
dissented on the ground that the facts alleged did not
1(1963-1964)
110
C.L.R. 194;
37
A.L.J.R. 413. High Court
of
Australia; Dixon C.J.,
McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ.
2 ,
11
(l.)-Any
person who is injured
...
by reason
of
any act
or
thing done
...
in contravention
...
of
this Act
...
may, in the High Court, before aJustice without
ajury, sue for and recover treble damages for the injury.'
3
'4
(1.)-Any
person who, either as principal
or
as agent, makes
or
enters into
any contract,
or
is
or
continues to be amember
of or
engages in any combination, in
relation to trade
or
commerce with other countries
or
among the
States-(a)
in restraint
of
or
with intent
to
restrain trade
or
commerce;
or
(b) to the destruction
or
injury
of
or
with the intent to destroy
or
injure by means
of
unfair competition any Australian
industry the preservation
of
which is advantageous
to
the Commonwealth, having due
regard to the interests
of
producers, workers
and
consumers, is guilty
of
an offence.'
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