Reducing the Democratic Deficit? Devolution and the Accountability of Public Organisations in Wales
| Published date | 01 January 2001 |
| Date | 01 January 2001 |
| Author | Rachel E. Ashworth,Richard M. Walker,George A. Boyne |
| DOI | 10.1177/095207670101600101 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Reducing
the
Democratic
Deficit?
Devolution
and
the
Accountability
of
Public
Organisations
in
Wales
Rachel
E.
Ashworth,
George
A.
Boyne
and
Richard
M.
Walker
Cardiff
University
Abstract
Devolution
is
viewed
as
a
way
to
deal
with
the
perceived
'democratic
deficit'
in
Wales.
It
can
be
argued
that
political
accountability
has
already
been
enhanced
by
the
creation
of a
new
directly-elected
democratic
institution.
However,
equally
crucial
to
the
success
of
devolution
is
improved
organisa-
tional
accountability,
which
is
likely
to
be
more
difficult
to
achieve.
In
this
paper
we
evaluate
the
effectiveness
of
the
accountability
arrangements
in
place
before
the
establishment
of
a Welsh
Assembly.
We
examine
the role
of
the
Welsh
Office,
Parliamentary
Select
Committees,
National
Audit
Office
and
the
Audit
Commission.
We
then
analyse
the
new
accountability
framework
for
Wales,
in
particular
the
early
work
of
the
assembly
committees.
The
view
of
politicians
and
officials
is
that
post-devolution
scrutiny
regimes
are
beginning
to
strengthen
organisational
accountability
in
Wales.
Introduction
Whilst
devolution
has
primarily
been
presented
as
a
response
to
a
growing
national
political
identity
in
Scotland
(McGarvey
and
Midwinter,
2000),
in
Wales
it
is
viewed
as
a
solution
to
a
perceived
'democratic
deficit'.
The
White
Paper,
'A
Voice
for
Wales',
emphasised
the
importance
of
stronger
public
accountability
as
a
key
rationale
behind
the
setting
up
of
the
National
Assembly
for
Wales
(Welsh
Office,
1997).
Certainly
Wales
has
experienced
difficulties
holding
public
bodies
such
as
quangos
to
account.
This
has
perhaps
best
been
illustrated
by
the
high-profile
investigation
into
the
activities
of
the
Welsh
Development
Agency
by
the
Public
Accounts
Committee
in
1993
(Law,
1999).
It
has
been
suggested
that
such
difficulties
have
arisen
partly
because
large-scale
service
delivery
has
resulted
in
a
public
sector
that
is
dependent
on
managers
and
professionals
who
are
not
directly
accountable
to
citizens
or
elected
representatives
(Day
and
Klein,
Public
Policy
and
Administration
Volume
16
No.
I
Spring
2001
I
1987).
There
is
belief
that
devolution
can
resolve
some
of
these
difficulties:
'Devolution
to
a
...
Welsh
Assembly
...
offers
another
prospect
for
the
extension
of
democratic
control
into
quangodom'
(Skelcher,
1998,
p.45).
Whilst
devolved
government
clearly
produces
a
new
set
of
politicians
who
are
more
directly
accountable
to
the
electorate,
it
is
less
clear
whether
public
sector
organisations
in
Wales
will
become
more
accountable
to
politicians
post-devolution.
Thus,
devolution
may
result
in
greater
political
account-
ability,
but
not
necessarily
in
greater
organisational
accountability.
This
latter
form
of
accountability
is
crucial
to
the
success
of
devolution
in
Wales.
Unless
Welsh
public
sector
organisations
are
regulated
effectively
by
elected
representatives,
the
chain
of
public
accountability
is
broken.
In
the
White
Paper
'A
Voice
for
Wales'
the
government
stated
that
the
National
Assembly
for
Wales
will
operate
under
'maximum
openness
and
public
accountability'
(Chapter
4,
p.2).
The
paper
suggests
that
if
Assembly
audit,
subject
and
regional
committees
work
properly
and
effectively,
the
regulation
of
the
executive
and
sponsored
bodies
in
Wales
will
improve.
However,
there
is
a
view
that
the
nature
of
devolution
in
Wales
is
unlikely
to
result
in
improvements
in
the
accountability
of
public
services.
This
concern,
emanating
principally
from
Westminster,
but
also
expressed
within
Wales,
questions
the
extent
to
which
an
Assembly
with
limited
powers
and
supported
by
a
former
Whitehall
department
can
successfully
hold
public
service
organisations
in
Wales
to
account
(Osmond,
1999).
Clearly,
the
new
scrutiny
frameworks
established
in
conjunction
with
devolution
are
central
to
the
aim
of
improving
accountability
mechanisms.
This
paper
seeks
to
evaluate
the
new
framework
and
mechanisms
for
accountability
established
for
Welsh
public
service
organisations.
Firstly,
we
evaluate
the
effectiveness
of
pre-devolution
accountability
regimes.
We
examine
these
in
relation
to
six
public
service
case
studies.
Subsequently,
we
present
details
of
scrutiny
and
accountability
arrangements
established
for
Welsh
public
service
agencies
in
conjunction
with
devolution.
Finally,
we
make
a
preliminary
assessment
of
the
extent
to
which
the
new
arrangements
enhance
the
accountability
of
public
service
organisations.
Accountability
Accountability
is
widely
recognised
as
a
fundamental
element
of
democratic
government
but
also
as
a
complicated
concept
which
is
often
ill-defined:
It
is
both
a
normative
concept
which
provides
a
foundation
principle
for
democratic
political
systems
and
a
complex,
multifaceted,
and
dynamic
process
taking
place
on
a
daily
basis
within
governments.
(Thomas,
1998,
p.348)
Jackson
(1982)
argued
that
legal
and
financial
regulation,
combined
with
the
doctrine
of
ministerial
responsibility
and
local
forms
of
democratic
account-
ability,
characterised
the
nature
of
accountability
for
public
services
under
'old
public
administration'.
Under
systems
of
political
accountability,
such
as
ministerial
responsibility,
elected
politicians
were
held
accountable
for
the
policy
decisions
taken
by
a
government
department.
In
theory,
the
function
Public
Policy
and
Administration
Volume
16
No.
I
Spring
2001
2
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