Reductionism and library and information science philosophy
| Pages | 482-495 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/00220410810884048 |
| Date | 25 July 2008 |
| Published date | 25 July 2008 |
| Author | Bonna Jones |
| Subject Matter | Information & knowledge management,Library & information science |
Reductionism and library and
information science philosophy
Bonna Jones
School of Business Information Technology, RMIT University,
Melbourne, Australia
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this article is to consider the meaning of “reductionism” within the context
of renewed efforts to make library and information science philosophy.
Design/methodology/approach – This article argues that the question of reductionism, as
discussed in other traditions of thought, is relevant to the conversation about development of new
library and information science (LIS) philosophy. Based on the viewpoint that one can be opposed to
philosophical reductionism yet still be in favour of science, some forms of reductionism are described
and links are drawn to library and information science by way of examples.
Findings – How reductionism is defined and understood should be addressed in the efforts to make
new LIS philosophy.
Originality/value – Being “non-reductionist” can be a stance in its own right, as evidenced by
broader transdisciplinary conversations, but this is yet to be considered at any depth in LIS.
Keywords Information science,Complexity theory, Philosophy,Cause and effect analysis
Paper type Conceptual paper
Despite a revival of interest in creating new library and information science (LIS)
philosophy (Buckland, 2003; Budd, 2001; Hjørland, 2005a; Radford and Radford , 2005;
Sundin and Johannisson, 2005; Talja et al., 2005; Wiegand, 1999), the question of
reductionism has so far received little attention in LIS. One writer has argued that
“determinist scientism” has no place in LIS philosophy because it is too reductionist
and has urged us to adopt phenomenological hermeneutics instead (Budd, 2001), but
apart from this, the broader transdisciplinary debate calling for development of a
non-reductionist science is not being referenced by authors in LIS. For instance the
question of whether a less reductionist stance could be achieved without abandoning
science is yet to be discussed. Given this larger context, what is meant by
“reductionism”? Is the question of reductionism, as discussed in other traditions of
thought, relevant to the conversation about development of new LIS philosophy?
What is reductionism?
In everyday language “reduce” is an action, that of making smaller or less; it is
associated with decreasing, simplifying, converting, lowering, weakening, diminishing
and so on (Oxford University Press, 2000). In cooking for example we boil a liquid to
reduce it to a more concentrated form; in photography we reduce an image to a smaller
size. In science, chemists can initiate a chemical reaction that red uces a whole to its
more simple parts; for example passing an electric current through water releases
hydrogen and oxygen into their separate gas states. These are simple acts, relatively
speaking, but when we switch our viewpoint to the level of human ideas, and their
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JDOC
64,4
482
Received 28 November 2006
Revised 24 July 2007
Accepted 3 August 2007
Journal of Documentation
Vol. 64 No. 4, 2008
pp. 482-495
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
0022-0418
DOI 10.1108/00220410810884048
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