Refusing to Provide a Name and Address and the Common Law Right to Remain Silent: Neale v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] EWHC 658 (Admin)
| Author | Neil Parpworth |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220183211016055 |
| Published date | 01 August 2021 |
| Date | 01 August 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
Case Note
Refusing to Provide a Name
and Address and the Common
Law Right to Remain Silent
Neale v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021]
EWHC 658 (Admin)
Keywords
Name and address, implied obligation, wilful obstruction, lawful excuse, right to silence
The appellant was approached by two police community support officers (PCSOs) in Newport City
Centre and asked on numerous occasions to explain why he was present in a public place at the height of
the coronavirus pandemic. Despite being told that he was obliged to do so, the appellant refused to state a
reason for his presence. He also refused to comply with requests to provide his name and address to the
PCSOs. One of the PCSOs requested assistance which was provided by two police officers. The
appellant continued to refuse to provide his name and address when asked to do so by one of the police
officers. The information was sought for the purpose of issuing him with a fixed penalty notice for being
in breach of the Health Protection (Coronavirus Restrictions) (Wales) Regulations 2020, SI No 353, (the
Coronavirus Regulations) as amended. In the light of his non-cooperation, the appellant was arrested and
taken to a police station.
At his subsequent trial for wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty contrary
to s 89(2) of the Police Act 1996, it was submitted that there was no case to answer because the
appellant had not been under a legal duty to provide his name and address when requested to do so by
the police officer. In support of this contention, the appellant relied on the decision in Rice v Connolly
[1966] 2 QB 414.
The justices rejected this submission and found the appellant guilty of the s 89(2) offence. They did so
on the basis that the police officer had been carrying out his duties during lockdown in enforcing the
Coronavirus Regulations and that the appellant’s behaviour had made it more difficult for the officer to
engage with him regarding a potential breach of the Regulations. The justices distinguished Rice v
Connolly on the ground that Rice had been going about his lawful business at the time of his encounter
with the police, whereas in the present case, having refused to provide a reason for not being at home, the
appellant was prima facie in breach of the Regulations. The justices had further considered that the
Regulations would be inoperable if a person could evade a fixed penalty notice for their breach simply by
refusing to provide their name and address. Accordingly, they had considered that there was an implied
obligation in the Regulations to furnish this information when requested to do so.
The appellant was acquitted on a separate charge, that of being in a public place without a reasonable
excuse contrary to regs 8(1) and 12(1)(b) and (4) of the Coronavirus Regulations, on the basis that since
he was homeless he was entitled to rely on the exception provided for in reg 8(4). In any event, the
justices accepted that he had a reasonable excuse for being in a public place at the relevant time because
he had taken a vehicle, belonging to a key worker friend, to have an MOT.
The Journal of Criminal Law
2021, Vol. 85(4) 325–328
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00220183211016055
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