Regarding the Dutch `Nee' to the European Constitution
| Author | Marcel Lubbers |
| Published date | 01 March 2008 |
| Date | 01 March 2008 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1465116507085957 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Regarding the Dutch ‘
Nee
’ to
the European Constitution
A Test of the Identity, Utilitarian and
Political Approaches to Voting ‘No’
Marcel Lubbers
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
In June 2005, 61.5% of the Dutch voted ‘
nee
’ in the refer-
endum on the European constitution. In the present contri-
bution I test hypotheses from the national identity, utilitarian
and political approaches to explain this voting behaviour. I
collected data in the Netherlands to test whether one of
those approaches has been decisive in explaining the refer-
endum outcome. I also provide information about whether
specific EU evaluations from these approaches explain the
voting behaviour, thus bringing in the discussion on the
importance of domestic political evaluations (second-order
election effects). I also test hypotheses on which theoretical
approach explains differences between social categories in
rejecting the constitution. My results show that specifically
EU evaluations in particular accounted for the ‘no’ vote,
although in conjunction with a strong effect from domestic
political evaluations. I also find evidence for ‘party-following
behaviour’ irrespective of people’s attitudes. Utilitarian
explanations determine the ‘no’ vote less well than political
or national identity explanations. The strongest impact on
voting ‘no’ came from a perceived threat from the EU to
Dutch culture.
59
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507085957
Volume 9 (1): 59–86
Copyright© 2008
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
KEY WORDS
European constitution
Euroscepticism
national identity
referendum
The Netherlands
Introduction
In June 2005, the Netherlands said ‘no’ to the European constitution. With
61.5% of the vote, the Dutch rejection of the constitution was even more
resounding than the French. It was also more of a surprise, despite the fact
that polls had predicted a ‘no’ vote. From Eurobarometer research the Dutch
public is known for its positive attitude toward EU membership (Norris,
1999). Though increasing scepticism is reported since the early 1990s, even in
the month prior to the referendum 64% agreed that EU membership is a good
thing, which made the Dutch among the most positive in Europe (European
Commission, 2007). It is hence of interest to test which specific national or EU
concerns motivated the Dutch ‘no’.
Many of the explanations given for the referendum results refer to the
campaign (Aarts and Van der Kolk, 2005; Lucardie, 2005; De Vreese, 2006), but
there were specific content-related explanations as well. A popular interpret-
ation of the vote among left-wing political parties is the claim that ‘people
really want a different Europe, one that is more social and less bureaucratic’
(GreenLeft, 2006). Another explanation relates to the sovereignty and identity
of the Netherlands. In an expanding Union, so the explanation goes, the
Netherlands would disappear from the map. This fear was captured on a
campaign poster produced by the Dutch Socialist Party, in which the
Netherlands had disappeared into the North sea (Socialist Party, 2006). Finally,
people were said to have turned their backs on the EU because of the prospec-
tive membership of Turkey, an issue with which Dutch politician Wilders and
his anti-Islam Party for Freedom allied themselves through the ‘No to Turkey’
campaign (PVV, 2006). Many of these single elucidations are related to the
discussion on the importance of three overarching explanations for Euro-
scepticism and voting in referendums on EU topics: people are assumed to be
driven by either economic, political or threatened-identity motives (Anderson
and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Ehin, 2001; Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Díez
Medrano, 2003; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; Hooghe and Marks, 2005;
Luedtke, 2005; McLaren, 2006; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007). Attention to such
EU evaluations do arouse suspicion that referendum results are determined by
issue voting, as has been shown in studies on referendums in Denmark and
Ireland (Svensson, 2002; Garry et al., 2005), and that ‘second-order election’
explanations, i.e. evaluations of national politics being decisive in referendum
voting, are of less importance (Franklin et al., 1994; Franklin, 2002; Garry et al.,
2005). Moreover, it makes apparent that a general EU evaluation explanation
will not suffice. It is hence of importance to separate effects from EU attitudes
according to the domains of the economy, politics and threatened identity.
For the Netherlands, it has become clear that those parties with a ‘no’
campaign – all on the fringes of the political spectrum: Wilders’ Party for
European Union Politics 9(1)
60
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