Regional Powers’ Rise and Impact on International Conflict and Negotiation: China and India as Global and Regional Players
| Author | Amrita Narlikar |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12673 |
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
Regional Powers’Rise and Impact on
International Conflict and Negotiation: China
and India as Global and Regional Players
Amrita Narlikar
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies and University of Hamburg
Abstract
In this article, I investigate the impact that the rise of regional powers as global players has had on the nature of international
conflict, and also the negotiating table. I focus specifically on China and India, and analyze their negotiating behavior in two
areas: one multilateral, the other regional. Despite the apparent similarities that one might assume at first glance, the article
points to some significant points of difference between these two players. The differences are important from a policy per-
spective, besides being theoretically interesting. The argument proceeds in five parts. The first section explains the reasoning
behind the case selection, with respect to the countries (China and India) as well as issue-areas (multilateral trade governance,
and the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI]). It also outlines the main hypotheses in Section 1. Section 2 investigates the two
hypotheses about the negotiation behaviors of China and India in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Section 3 takes on a
similar comparison with reference to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Section 4 presents the conclusions of the study, and
Section 5 offers policy recommendations.
Case-selection and hypotheses
This article focuses on China and India, two powers that
have risen dramatically in the last two decades. The resili-
ence of their rising trajectories has outlived the ups and
downs that have accompanied the concept of the BRICs.
Both countries are more than “just”regional powers,
whether one looks at the hard criteria (e.g. in terms of GDP,
China ranks 2nd and India ranks 6th; in military spending,
China again ranks 2nd, while India ranks 5th; both are states
with declared nuclear weapons’status) or applies soft crite-
ria (e.g. activism in global institutions). Nonetheless, the
regional dimension matters quite significantly for both China
and India, not least because they share a contested region
and are competing within it. Also, given that their interna-
tional roles are still under negotiation both domestically and
internationally, we would expect them to explore regional
pathways to global power.
In terms of the issue-areas, the first case of the WTO
works straightforwardly at the global level and allows us to
compare the approaches of the two rising powers towards
multilateral rules. The second case of China’s BRI begins at
the regional level but has trans-regional implications, and
also provides an interesting contrast to India’s approach
towards the region and its lack of a parallel strategy. Both
cases deal with important economic issues, but also have a
strong geostrategic component. The comparison between
the two issue-areas facilitates some further insights on the
differential importance that the two powers attach to their
shared region as well as multilateralism. While the central
focus of the article is on the behaviors and strategies of
China and India as rising regional powers, the investigation
sheds some new light on the reaction that this prompts
from the incumbents, and the impact of the resultant bar-
gaining upon global governance more broadly.
What impact would we expect the rise of regional powers
to have on the nature of conflict and negotiation? This arti-
cle advances two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: As even relative capability diffuses
away from the established powers and (in good
measure) towards regional and rising powers, the
established powers will show declining ability and
willingness to provide global public goods (Kindle-
berger, 1973). New powers are unlikely to readily
take on these responsibilities. The reluctance of the
new powers would be even higher if they are
developing countries and have different priorities
and visions of order from those of the incumbents.
This would result in a leadership vacuum at the
international level. Two results follow (Hale and
Held, 2017; Narlikar, 2010; Spektor and Zartman,
2003; Zartman and Touval, 2010). First, we would
likely expect deadlock and conflict to increase. And
second, the effectiveness of multilateral institutions
would decline, thereby exacerbating deadlock and
conflict further and decreasing the likelihood of
breakthroughs. A leadership vacuum resulting from
the changing balance of power is the main mecha-
nism focused on in this article. It is worth noting,
however, that several other causal mechanisms
may also be at work, which reinforce the decline in
©2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2019) 10:Suppl.2 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12673
Global Policy Volume 10 . Issue Supplement 2 . June 2019
22
Special Issue Article
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