Relegated No Longer? The Role of Malice in the Delictual Protection of Liberty: Whitehouse v Gormley
Date | 01 January 2019 |
Published date | 01 January 2019 |
Author | |
Pages | 75-82 |
DOI | 10.3366/elr.2019.0525 |
Disputes about nomenclature in law sometimes turn out to be no more than exercises in branding. On other occasions, the inability to settle on the name of a legal concept may be symptomatic of deeper doctrinal unrest. This, it is submitted, is evident in the case of the delictual protection of the right to liberty. The general heading of “injuries to liberty” describes only the result of the wrongdoing, and does not indicate how that wrongdoing might manifest itself. Terms which seek to describe the events which may give rise to an actionable injury to liberty tend to consist of an adjective paired with a noun. The various nouns employed include “apprehension”, “imprisonment” and “detention”, not one of which accurately captures the fact that an actionable constraint on movement may entail simply a restraint on the movement of certain limbs.
The pursuer raised an action seeking compensation from the Lord Advocate and Police Scotland, craving damages of £9 million. He alleged financial loss (as an insolvency practitioner, the pending prosecution rendered him unable to practice) and reputational damage. His claims were founded on allegations that the Lord Advocate's pursuit of the investigation and prosecution amounted to the delict of malicious prosecution,
The protection of liberty through the law of delict in Scotland is under-theorised. The fullest consideration, which unfortunately does not appear to have been relied on in
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