Reluctant Heroes
| Published date | 01 December 1998 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209805300409 |
| Author | Alan James |
| Date | 01 December 1998 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ALAN
JAMES
Reluctant
heroes
Assembling the
United
Nations
Cyprus
Force,
1964
THE
FIRST
TWO
PEACEKEEPING FORCES
under
the
auspices
of
the
Unit-
ed
Nations
were
assembled
with
remarkable
speed.
When
the
General
Assembly asked
the
secretary-general
to
make
plans for
the
despatch
of
an
'emeregency
force'
to
Suez
in
November
1956,
within
days
no
fewer
than
twenty-four
states
had
offered
a
military
contingent.
Ten
were
accepted,
and
some
troops
could
have
been
in
place
immediately.
As
it
happened,
there
was
a
small delay before
the
initial
elements
of
the
United
Nations
Emergency
Force
arrived
in
Egypt
because
the
secre-
tary-general
had
to
sort
out
certain
matters
with
the
host
state.
Nonetheless, this
signal
development
in
the
history
of
the
United
Nations
got
off
to
a
flying
start.
In
July
1960,
in
the
(ex-Belgian)
Congo,
it
was
even
quicker
off
the
mark;
the
first
contributor's troops
arrived
the
day
after
the
Security
Council
had
decided
to
act. In
time,
they
were
joined
by
personnel
from
29
other
states.
Evidently,
there
was
no
shortage
of
volunteers
for
this
new activity.
A
variety
of
factors explain
the
contributors'
zeal.
In
the
Congo,
one
of
them
was
undoubtedly
the
success
which
seemed
to
have
attended
the
first,
and on-going, operation.
The
Egyptian-Israeli
border
-
to
which the
United
Nations
force
had
moved
once
the
invaders
had
withdrawn
from
Suez
-
had
lost
the
high tension which had
been
its
hallmark.
The
underlying problem
had
by
no means
been
solved.
But
gratitude
for
the
respite
was
clearly in
order, and
it
was
easy
(too
easy!)
to
assume
a
direct link
between
the
United
Nations
military
presence
This
article
ispartofa
wider
project,
The
Cyprus
Crisis
of
1963-64:
Origin,
Course,
and
Aftermath,
to be
published
by
Macmillan
in
2000.
The
research
was
supported
by
Britain's
Eco-
nomic
and
Social
Research
Council,
to which
the
author
is
deeply
grateful
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Autumn
1998
Alan
James
and
the
prevailing
calm.
The
Congo
problem
was
of
a
quite
different
kind
-
internal rather
than
international.
But
helping
the
new
states
of
Africa was
seen
as
an
undeniably
good
cause;
and
it
was
easily
(too
eas-
ily!)
supposed
that
the
United
Nations
badge
would
serve
as
a
talis-
man.
It
was
not
to
be.
In no
time
the
operation
was
bogged
down
in deep
controversy
which,
to
one
degree or
another,
continued
until
1963.
Fighting
-
which
had
not
been
thought
to
be
on
the
peacekeeping
agenda
-
occurred,
some
of
it
finding
the
United
Nations
in
defensive
mode,
some
of
it
not.
Naturally,
it
involved
casualties
-
another
nasty
shock. Dag
Hammarskj6ld,
the
charismatic
United Nations
secretary-
general,
was
killed
in
the
area
-
almost
certainly
by
accident,
but
his
death
heightened
the
operation's
malodour.
Debts
to
the
contributor
states
mounted
when
many
United Nations
members
failed
to
pay
for
what
was
being
done
on
their
collective
behalf.
The
result
was
a
fervent
wish
on
many
sides
to
be
done
with the
Congo. The
idea
of
peace-
keeping,
so
shinily
attractive
a
short
while
before,
had
become deeply
tarnished.
Yet
in
March
1964,
even
before
it
had
left
the
Congo,
the
United
Nations
was
proposing
to
send
a
force
to
another
volatile
internal
con-
flict: in
Cyprus
the
constitutional
effort
to
balance
the
interests
of
the
Greek-Cypriot majority
and
the
Turkish-Cypriot minority
was
com-
ing
apart
at
the
seams.
Moreover,
the
issue
had
highly
sensitive
inter-
national
ramifications: Turkey
(a
key
member
of
the
North
Atlantic
Treaty
Organization)
ostentatiously girded
its
loins against
the
possi-
bility
of
intervention,
and
Greece
(a
fellow
NATO
member) contem-
plated
the
necessity
of
responding
in
kind.
Very
possibly,
in
this
third
venture
states
might
display
less
enthusiasm
for
enrolling
their
men
under
United
Nations
colours.
CYPRIOT
FASTIDIOUSNESS
Initially
there
was
talk
of
a
United
Nations
Force
in
Cyprus
(UNFICYP)
of
10,000.
Perhaps seeing
this
as
the
opening
bid
in
a
bargaining
ploy,
the
president
of
Cyprus, Archbishop
Makarios,
said
that
7,000
would
be
enough.
As
it
turned
out,
that
was
the
figure
recommended
by
Gen-
eral
Michael
Carver, the
second
commander
of
the
British Truce Force
which
had
been
attempting
to
keep
the
peace since
late
December
1963.
All
sides
having
accepted
that
it
would
be
a
major
contributor
to
UNFICYP,
Britain
offered
to
match
other
contributions
up
to
a
total
734
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Autumn
1998
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