Replies
| Author | Andrea Sangiovanni |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885119889228 |
| Published date | 01 July 2020 |
| Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Symposium on Andrea Sangiovanni's Humanity without Dignity |
Symposium on Andrea Sangiovanni’s Humanity without Dignity EJPT
Replies
Andrea Sangiovanni
King’s College London, UK
Abstract
In this article, I reply to Giacomo Floris, Adam Etinson, Daniel Corrigan, Luise Mu¨ller
and Johannes Haaf.
Keywords
Basic equality, dignity, human rights, moral equality, moral status
I am very grateful to Adam Etinson, Giacomo Floris, Daniel Corrigan, Luise
Mu
¨ller and Johannes Haaf for writing such probing, thoughtful and careful
responses to Humanity Without Dignity (HWD). I first address the two responses
on the idea of moral equality (Etinson and Floris), and then the ones on human
rights (Corrigan and Mu
¨ller/Haaf). To keep this exchange readably short, I have
refrained from trying to answer every point or challenge made. Instead, I have
tried, to the best of my ability, to choose the lines of argument that struck me as
most salient and most instructive.
Etinson
Etinson’s perceptive and illuminating defence of dignity trades on a distinction
between condition and status dignity.
1
Status dignity, possessed equally by all and
only human beings, gives rise to second-personal demands to be treated with dig-
nity and first-personal demands to act with dignity. To be treated with dignity
means to be treated in accordance with one’s elevated status as a human being, and
to act with dignity means to act in accordance with one’s position – to act with a
Corresponding author:
Andrea Sangiovanni, King’s College London, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK.
Email: andrea.sangiovanni@eui.eu
European Journal of Political Theory
2020, Vol. 19(3) 433–441
!The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885119889228
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