Reply to Critics
| Date | 01 December 2014 |
| Published date | 01 December 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0964663914541590 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Reply to Critics
Hauke Brunkhorst
University of Flensburg, Germany
Abstract
In responding to the comments, I will begin with the problem of Eurocentrism, the
notion of progress and the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Then I will try to address the
methodological queries concerning theory construction. Thereafter, I will make some
remarks on the role of religion for social evolution and the formation of the Kantian
mindset. Finally, I will discuss the problem of cosmopolitan state formation, co-evolution
and societal differentiation.
Keywords
Legal revolution, social evolution, co-evolution, evolutionary universals, adaptation,
normative constraints, negation, differentiation, state formation, law and religion,
progress, class struggle
The fact that my book has motivated so many significant voices from different scientific
backgrounds to comment and criticize my provisional studies on the evolution of modern
constitutional law has surprised me. Yet it delights me even more, as it gives me the
opportunity to clarify some of my ideas a bit further. What also surprised me was the
variety of topics addressed in the commentaries. These concern the world state debate,
the co-evolution thesis, the relation of revolution and evolution, the role of law in rev-
olutionary change, the function of religion for social evolution, the concept of progress
and the Dialectic of Enlightenment and the methodological problems of constructing
Critical Theory.
There are intriguing complementarities and surprising coalitions in the commentaries.
Although Habermas and Lafont argue that I am on the right track, overly functionalist,
Albert and Thornhill argue that I am on the right track but not functionalist enough.
However, Thornhill criticizes the normative overburdening of my theory construction;
Corresponding author:
Hauke Brunkhorst, University of Flensburg, Nassauische Str. 54, Berlin 10717, Germany.
Email: haukebrunk@aol.com
Social & Legal Studies
2014, Vol. 23(4) 577–605
ªThe Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0964663914541590
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Albert does not. On the other hand, Albert and Habermas both argue that I rely too
strongly on Luhmann’s idea of a functionally differentiated world society, an idea that
for them is not differentiated enough.
In responding to these comments, I will begin (1) with the problem of Eurocentrism,
the notion of progress and the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Then (2) I will try to address
the methodological queries concerning theory construction, for which I hardly have any
resolution. Thereafter, (3) I will make some remarks on the, arguably, emancipatory role
of religion for social evolution and the formation of the Kantian mindset. Finally, I will
discuss (4) the problem of cosmopolitan state formation, co-evolution and societal
differentiation.
Eurocentrism and the Dialectic of Enlightenment
The problem of Eurocentrism is posed by Cristina Lafont right from the outset, and
rightly so. It is true that my conceptual resources are all derived from the so-called West-
ern tradition (as are hers). This is simply because I have not studied any other. However,
it would be misleading on that ground alone to argue that the processes I am talking
about are entirely endogenous to the West, which only contains the Judaeo-Christian and
Graeco-Roman tradition of occidental rationalism (Lafont, 2014: 8).
1
Evidently, these
processes are not exclusive to the West. This fact, by now, is beyond reasonable doubt,
thanks to postcolonial studies and global history (which I did take into account, at least
selectively). Neither instrumental and moral universalism nor enlightenment and ‘inner-
wordly asceticism’ [innerweltliche Askese], are mere Western inventions. Even if we, as
I think, should not renounce Max Weber’s theory of rationalization, we should abandon
his polemical basic distinction between Eastern passivism (man as a vessel of God,
who waits for redemptive rain) and Western activism (man as an instrument of God, who
works day and night for salvation). I also do not want to suggest (and I should have said
it already in the book) that there were no significant legal developments in India, China,
Japan, Africa and so on, which in the course of thousands of years of more or less dense
interaction became part and parcel of the ‘Western’ legal tradition (which, for this reason
in particular, is not simply ‘western’).
However, I have used the concept of evolutionary universals throughout the book for
several reasons, and they are all closely related to the problem of Eurocentrism and, as
Robert Fine rightly observes, to the idea of progress. To explain this, I must go back to
elucidate how I reread some basic concepts of Kant and Hegel, concerning the relation of
universal concepts and normative progress within the theory of social evolution. This
rereading already contains certain elements of decentration of Eurocentrism.
First, as I use basic categories of social evolution, and some results of historical
research only within this categorical framework, from the outset I use categories that are
more abstract and decontextualized than historical categories.
2
Therefore, these cate-
gories are in a way placed in equal distance to any kind of contextual centrism. Evolu-
tionary categories relate only contingently to specific places in historical time and space.
They are abstracted from history, and, therefore, they rely on historical research, but
they are not history. In contrast to history, evolutionary theory uses categories such as
‘communication’, ‘differentiation’, ‘evolutionary advance’, ‘negation’, ‘segmentation’,
578 Social & Legal Studies 23(4)
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