REPORTS OF COMMITTEES
| Date | 01 March 1976 |
| Published date | 01 March 1976 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1976.tb01453.x |
REPORTS
OF
COMMITTEES
REPORT
OF
THE
COMMITTEE
ON
DEFAMATION
NEARLY
30
years havc elapsed since the last Government Committee
on
defamation,
so
that
a
review of the law is seasonable. The final
recommendations of the Faulks Committecl are in many ways
a
logical progression from those of the Porter Committee which
reported in
1948;
but although succeeding in its aim
of
simplifying the
law, the Committee has not taken thc opportunity for any radical
reform.
1.
What
is
defamatory?
The first major change rccommcnded by the Committee is the long
overdue abolition
of
the distinction between libel and
lander,^
recog-
nised
as
obsoletc for many years. Indeed, it may well bc asked if it
ever
served
any useful purpose, since it grew up by accident rathcr
than by de~ign.~ But the Committee
goes
further than the mere assimi-
lation
of
slander to libel and proposcs a statutory definition of
defamation to replace the welter
of
common law dicta, considered to
be too vague and confusing. The Committee’s proposed definition is
that:
“
Defamation shall consist of thc publication to a third party
of
matter which
in
all the circumstances would be likely to affect
a
person adversely in the estimation of reasonablc people
generally.”
Two mcmbers
of
the Committce dissented from this definition because
any statutory definition,
no
matter
how
general in terms. is bound to
fail in providing for the variety of circumstances in which defamation
actions may arise:
a
view takcn
also
by the Portcr Committee.
For
example, to suggest that a person is suffering from a mental illncss
would not lower him in the estimation of reasonable people generally-
the reasonable reaction would surely be to pity his misfortune. The
problem
is
the translation of
“
right-thinking
”
in the traditional
definition
O
into
“
reasonable
”
:
presumably the latter word is merely
intended to indicate an elcmcnt
of
objectivity; but clearly. public
opinion is frcquently very unreasonablc. This is why an imputation
that a woman has becn raped has
been
held to be defamatory’ and
1
Cmnd. 5909 March 1975
(all
rcfcrcnccs hcrmftcr arc
to
this Rcport unless
othcnvise stated).
2
Cmd. 7536.
3
CI.
1
(2)
and (3)
Draft
Bill.
4
But the distinction between written and spoken words may be important
to
the
extent that the
way
words arc said often affects their meaning.
6
C1.
1
(1)
Draft Bill.
0
Words
having.
a
tendency
“
to lower thc plaintiff in the estimation
of
right-
thinking members
of
society generally’
per
Atkin
L.J.
in
Sin1
v.
Sirerch
(1936) 52
T.L.R.
669.
7
Yoiasoupofl
v.
M.G.M.
(1934) 50 T.L.R. 581.
187
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