REPORTS OF COMMITTEES
| Date | 01 July 1983 |
| Author | C. P. Walker |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1983.tb02530.x |
| Published date | 01 July 1983 |
REPORTS
OF
COMMITTEES
THE
JELLICOE
REPORT
ON
THE
PREVENTION OF
TERRORISM
(TEMPORARY
PROVISIONS)
ACT
1976
Introduction
SINCE
the cataclysmic birth of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act (following two I.R.A. bombings in Birmingham in
1974),
the legislation has been subjected to almost constant scrutiny.
Parliament itself has conducted
10
reviews (including complete re-
enactment in
1976),
and Lord Shackleton produced a lengthy report in
1978.l
Despite the quantity of these checks, the Acts have barely
altered since their inception, therefore, the further review announced
in March
1982
was to be welcomed. The Report recently produced by
the Earl Jellicoe compares favourably with its predecessor in terms of
thoroughness and output
of
proposals. However, even if all of its
suggestions are eventually translated into pra~tice,~ the overall result
will still be consolidation rather than fundamental reform.
In fairness, the Government must take much of the blame for this
mediocre performance because it constituted the Review subject to two
severe limitations. First, the Review’s terms of reference incorporated
the assumption that there is
“
continuing need for legislation against
terrorism,” and this was backed by a Ministerial direction that the
Review
“
ought not to focus on whether
or
not we need the Act.”
This framework implied that the bulk of the existing legislation was to
survive unscathed, thereby ensuring that the Report would be workman-
like rather than innovative. The second important limitation was that
the Review was directed to assess the operation only of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act. Thus, examination of the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act
1978
was forbidden territory, which meant that the
Review was seriously hamstrung in its consideration of the response to
terrorism in the Province.6
A third important and pervasive defect is more the responsibility of
the Review itself. In order to assess the Act, criteria of success or
failure must be delineated. Obviously, such legislation should be
demonstrably effective in terms either of the prevention of future
terrorism
or
the control of terrorism already occurring. However, the
ultimate test of the performance
of
a terrorist campaign is the measure
Review
of
the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Acts
1974
and 1976, Cmnd. 7324 (hereafter referred to as the
Cmnd. 8803 (hereafter referred to as the
“
Report
”).
The Government has already implemented all recommendations involving administra-
tive arrangements and is prepared to introduce new legislation but is uncommitted as to
its contents: H.C.Deb., Vol.
38,
col.
569
(March
7,
1983), Mr. Whitelaw.
Report,
p.
iv. The Report supports this assumption (at para.
1)
as did the Shackleton
Re ort (loc. cit. para. 160).
H.C.Deb., Vol.
20,
col.
1052
(March 16, 1982). Mr. Whitelaw.
6
The Report itself bemoans this difficulty:
loc
cit.
para. 6.
A
separate review
for
Northern Irish legislation is contemplated: H.C.Deb.,
Vol.
26,
cols.
943,
945 (June
30,
1982).
Shackleton Report
’I).
484
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