Representations of Political Argument: Applications within Meta-Planning
| Author | Ian Budge |
| Published date | 01 December 1978 |
| Date | 01 December 1978 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1978.tb01309.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
REPRESENTATIONS
OF
POLITICAL
ARGUMENT: APPLICATIONS WITHIN
META-PLANNING
IAN
BUDGE
UniversifJ
oj
Essex
Absrrucr.
Central to the best-known classification of Political Arguments is a distinction
between want-regarding and ideal-regarding principles, upon which this paper bases alter-
native representations
of
the dynamics
of
political debate. These are discussed with specific
reference to the possibility that want-regarding goals are served less well by British planning
decisions than
if
ideal-regarding arguments were permitted. The representations provide a
limited explanation of how such a situation might come about and
be
maintained. Initially
they draw on Downs’ models
of
voting and party competition, but explore alternatives
because of:
(1)
the possibility that some assumptions needed
for
a
Downsian representation
cannot realistically
be
made about political arguments; and
(2)
the probability that factors
other than verbal arguments enter into planning decisions.
1.
DEB
ATE
and argument are defining processes
of
democracy which deserve
more systematic study. Allison’s review
*
of
the assumptions underlying
planning decisions is important because it uses the best-known classification
of
political arguments, into want-regarding and ideal-regarding,2 to conclude that
only want-regarding arguments are permissible within the British ‘adminis-
trative culture’. This has the paradoxical consequence, that want-regarding
goals are served less well by planning decisions than
if
ideal-regarding
arguments were permitted.
Recent disruptions
of
planning enquiries in protest against their restrictive
framework lend this assertion a rare current relevance. This, and its pioneering
achievements in linking political theory with planning, render a systematic
evaluation potentially informative. Such an evaluation is best carried out by
setting out the reasoning as a formal model which explicitly states the
conditions under which
it
would apply. We can then ask whether these
conditions constitute a realistic description
of
the planning process, or whether
a broader approach might be more appropriate in terms
of
our present
knowledge. The note ends with a description
of
one such systematic,
quantitative approach which has the capability of showing empirically whether
Allison is right.
2.
Allison’s argument on the criteria applied to planning is set out most
explicitly in his earlier arti~le,~ but it quite clearly underlies the general
’
Lincoln
Allison,
Environmenrnl Planning: A Poliriral and Philosophicd Analysis
(London.
Allen and Unwin.
1975).
This incorporates the argument of an earlier article ‘Politics, Welfare and
Conservation
:
A Survey of Meta-Planning’,
British
Journnl
of
folifical
Science,
I
(1971). 437-52.
B.
Barry,
Political
Argument
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1965),
pp.
3844.
Allison, ‘Politics, Welfare and Conservation’.
Political
Studies, Vol.
XXVI,
No.
4
(439-449)
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