Representative Democracy as Tautology
| Author | Sofia Näsström |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885106064664 |
| Published date | 01 July 2006 |
| Date | 01 July 2006 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Representative Democracy as
Tautology
Ankersmit and Lefort on Representation
Sofia Näsström Stockholm University, Sweden
abstract: Representative democracy is often assessed from the standpoint of direct
democracy. Recently, however, many theorists have come to argue that representation
forms a democratic model in its own right. The most powerful claim in this direction
is to be found within two quite different strands of thinking: the aesthetic theory of
Frank Ankersmit and the savage theory of Claude Lefort. In this article, I show that
while Ankersmit and Lefort converge in their critique of direct rule, they provide us
with two distinct models of democracy. Aesthetic democracy, I argue, in the end falls
short as a democratic recuperation of representation. It reduces representation to
delegation. Savage democracy proves more fruitful in this respect. It offers a
representative view of politics without committing itself to the premises associated
with political delegation.
key words: action, aesthetics, Ankersmit, conflict, delegation, democracy, election, Lefort,
representation, totalitarianism
Introduction
Is representation democratic? If there are questions that provoke disagreement
among political theorists, this is certainly one of them. To advocates of direct
democracy it is no coincidence that early proponents of representative govern-
ment contrasted representation with democracy. When Madison asserts that the
voice of representatives is ‘more consonant to the good of people than if
pronounced by the people themselves’, he simply testifies to its undemocratic
nature.1Representation has little to do with popular rule. It is an aristocratic idea,
a device by which to forestall the kind of popular rule associated with Athenian
democracy.2However, if direct rule for many years has served as the archetype of
democracy one can today witness a renewed interest in the idea of representation.
Many contemporary theorists contend that the critique against representative
government is misdirected. The impulse to consider modern democracy through
321
article
Contact address: Sofia Näsström, Department of Political Science, Stockholm
University, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden.
Email: sofia.nasstrom@statsvet.su.se
EJPT
European Journal
of Political Theory
© SAGE Publications Ltd,
London, Thousand Oaks
and New Delhi
issn 1474-8851, 5(3)321–342
[DOI: 10.1177/1474885106064664]
the eyes of Athens is in fact what constitutes the main obstacle to a democratic
conception of representation. It blinds itself to the significance of modern forms
of democracy. It is high time to assess representative democracy on its ownterms.3
In this article, I shall examine the argument in favour of representation.4
Interestingly enough, the most powerful claim in this direction is to be found
within two radically different strands of thinking: the aesthetic theory of Frank
Ankersmit and the savage theory of Claude Lefort.5What Ankersmit and Lefort
have in common, I argue, is that they rethink the relationship between democracy
and representation. The question is not whether representation is democratic or
not, that is, if it matches up with the ancient ideal of a people ruling itself.
Representation is democracy. It is the modern form of popular rule. We must, as
Ankersmit writes, therefore ‘distrust all efforts, in political theory and in practice,
aiming to undo this doubling by seducing us with deceitful visions of unity and
harmony’.6In a similar vein, Lefort cautions against the temptation to restore
unity in society. It does not eradicate division, but it leads to the totalitarian image
of the ‘People-as-One’.7
Still, to claim that division is a necessary condition for democracy is not new. It
is an argument associated with, among others, Edmund Burke and Joseph
Schumpeter. So what makes the claim made by Ankersmit and Lefort into a
‘democratic’ recuperation of representation? As I shall argue, there are important
differences between Ankersmit and Lefort in this respect. While they both admit
their allegiance to Machiavelli’s idea of the brokenness of political reality, they
provide us with two distinct models of democracy. The problem with the aesthetic
model is that while it asserts that democracy dwells in the gap between repre-
sentatives and represented, it indirectly associates democracy with the actions of
representatives. This makes it difficult to see what separates aesthetic representa-
tion from the model of delegation advanced by Schumpeter, other than on the
ontological level. Savage democracy comes off better in this respect. It avoids
both the pitfalls of contrasting modern democracy with Athens, and the equally
unfortunate move of committing itself to the premises associated with political
delegation.
The argument falls into four sections. In the first section, I introduce the debate
on democracy and representation, with particular attention given to the distinc-
tion between representation and election. In the second section, I examine the
argument in favour of representation. What is democratic about representation,
and on what grounds can one make such a claim? In the third section, I undertake
a closer examination of the aesthetic and savage model of democracy. The point
is to show that a representative politics may take different forms, all depending on
whether we adopt an aesthetic or savage viewpoint. I finally conclude with some
brief reflections on the political relevance of the aesthetic and savage model of
democracy.
European Journal of Political Theory 5(3)
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