Republicanism and Liberalism
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2007.00282.x |
| Author | Anthony J. Langlois |
| Date | 01 June 2007 |
| Published date | 01 June 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Research Article |
Research Article
Republicanism and Liberalism
Anthony J. Langlois
Flinders University
Republicanism has recently been defended by a variety of authors as a desirable alternative to
liberalism. John W. Maynor is one of these. In his recent book, he has argued that republicanism
is superior to liberalism, both in that its objectives are normatively preferable and because it is not
beset with the same constitutive deficiencies as liberalism. However, his argument fails because the
deficiencies he identifies in liberalism only apply to one class of liberals, and many of the normative
aspects of his republicanism can be found in other forms of liberalism.
John W. Maynor’s Republicanism in the Modern World (2003) is an interesting and
provocative adaptation of classical republicanism. In it, Maynor is particularly
concerned to achieve two tasks. The first of these is to develop an account of
republicanism which draws on its ancient Greek and Roman precedents, and yet
which is suited to the contemporary conditions of modern post-industrial demo-
cratic societies. Second, Maynor is concerned to defend this account against the
political school which he views as its closest competitor: liberalism. He is keen to
disrupt what many commentators have seen as the assimilation of republicanism to
liberalism. In this assimilation, the claim is that there is at best only a difference in
emphasis between the two schools of thought. Maynor disagrees strongly with this,
and makes a case for a clear and significant distinction between the two schools. He
proceeds with this by elaborating liberalism according to the formulations of two of
its most significant proponents of recent years, John Rawls and Will Kymlicka. He
then contrasts his formulation of republicanism with these theorists’ renderings of
liberalism in what amounts to a significant critique of the latter. Republicanism,
Maynor argues, is preferable because its objectives as a political ideology are
normatively superior and because it is not riddled with the same internal contra-
dictions as the liberalism which he has outlined by way of contrast. My intention in
what follows is to suggest that Maynor’s overall argument against liberalism suc-
ceeds only because of the failings of the particular forms of liberalism which he has
chosen to stand for the whole. Liberalism is, however, a broad church, and many of
the inadequacies which Maynor finds with the particular liberalisms he critiques
have also been the subject of in-house disputes. While Maynor shows his republi-
canism to be preferable to certain varieties of liberalism, other liberals have also
rejected these formulations of what must pertain for a society to be truly liberal.
Contrary to his claims, Maynor’s strategy does not enable him to show that repub-
licanism is preferable to liberalism tout court. I argue that liberalism, in other forms,
is not troubled by the content of Maynor’s critique.
POLITICS: 2007 VOL 27(2), 76–82
© 2007 The Author.Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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