Reputation and the occurrence and success of mediation in civil wars
| Author | Eric Keels,J Michael Greig |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343318811430 |
| Published date | 01 May 2019 |
| Date | 01 May 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Reputation and the occurrence and
success of mediation in civil wars
Eric Keels
One Earth Future Foundation
J Michael Greig
Castleberry Peace Institute, Department of Political Science, University of North Texas
Abstract
In this article, we argue that because governments fear that accepting mediation and reaching agreements with
opponents may signal weakness to other potential challengers, civil war governments tend to resist mediation as a
means of demonstrating their resolve. Building on current theories of reputation in civil war, we argue that the threat
of future challenges from other groups is likely to be particularly acute in states with multiple ethnic groups,
especially states with high levels of ethnic exclusion. We therefore expect that civil wars in these states will be less
likely to see mediation and to produce agreements when they do. By examining all instances of mediation in
intrastate conflict from 1990 to 2008, we test this argument empirically and find that mediation is more likely to
emerge in civil wars where there are a large number of ethnic groups, but is less likely to occur when many of those
ethnic groups are excluded from the political process. Once mediation is underway, however, it is less likely to yield a
negotiated settlement when there are a large number of ethnic groups, but more likely to end in a negotiated
settlement when many of the ethnic groups are excluded from the political process.
Keywords
agreement, civil war, ethnic group, excluded group, mediation, reputation
Introduction
The civil wars in Syria, South Sudan, and Ukraine
underscore the importance (and limitations) of media-
tion in ending conflicts. Mediation is one of the few tools
the international community can deploy to end see-
mingly intractable civil wars (DeRouen, Bercovitch &
Pospieszna, 2011). Unfortunately, the international
community often faces barriers to mediating difficult
conflicts. As noted by Greig & Regan (2008), while the
global community may desperately want some resolution
to ongoing civil wars, war-torn governments may be
loath to accept mediation. Furthermore, once mediation
is accepted, there is no guarantee that a settlement will be
reached. Even in cases where the international commu-
nity has a vested interest in resolving a civil war, media-
tion may fail to generate a durable solution. As
demonstrated by the failure in Syria, mediation efforts
may fail despite pressure from regional partners and
major powers.
What determines whether international mediation
efforts will produce a settlement to ongoing fighting?
We suggest that the incumbent government’s concerns
for its reputation and the potential for future challenges
against it, particularly from politically excluded groups,
act as a key barrier to mediation. As noted in Walter’s
(2006, 2009a) ground-breaking work on state reputation
and the accommodation of secessionist demands, gov-
ernments are less willing to acquiesce to self-
determination movements if they believe that other
groups may make similar future claims. Walter suggests
that if a government believes it will face future challenges
Corresponding authors:
ekeels@oneearthfuture.org; Michael.Greig@unt.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2019, Vol. 56(3) 410–424
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343318811430
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