Resilience in UK counter-terrorism
| Author | Keiran Hardy |
| DOI | 10.1177/1362480614542119 |
| Published date | 01 February 2015 |
| Date | 01 February 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
542119TCR0010.1177/1362480614542119Theoretical CriminologyHardy
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Article
Theoretical Criminology
2015, Vol. 19(1) 77 –94
Resilience in UK counter-
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DOI: 10.1177/1362480614542119
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Keiran Hardy
University of New South Wales, Australia
Abstract
Resilience describes the capacity of an individual, community or ecosystem to mitigate
the impact of a shock or disturbance and then to recover in its aftermath. In recent
years, resilience has become the favoured solution for a range of contemporary policy
problems including natural disasters, mental health issues and terrorism. However, the
concept is understood far less in criminology and counter-terrorism than in other fields
such as psychology and natural hazards studies. This article compares resilience-building
measures in the Prepare and Prevent strands of CONTEST, the UK government’s national
strategy for countering terrorism. Its aim is to explore the benefits and dangers of
resilience according to how the concept is defined and applied across different contexts.
Keywords
CONTEST, counter-terrorism, natural hazards, pre-emption, Prepare, Prevent strategy,
resilience, risk, vulnerability
Introduction
The concept of resilience developed in the ecological sciences in the 1970s, but it is fast
becoming the favoured solution for a range of contemporary policy problems including
natural disasters, mental health issues and terrorism. Resilience describes the ability of
an individual, community or ecosystem to overcome adversity—to absorb the impact of
a shock or disturbance and then to recover effectively (Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013:
255; Manyena, 2006: 438). The concept has been described as ‘very much the current
political buzzword’ (Joseph, 2013: 253), a ‘central organising metaphor within the
Corresponding author:
Keiran Hardy, Law Building, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia.
Email: k.a.hardy@unsw.edu.au
78
Theoretical Criminology 19(1)
(urban) policymaking process’ (Coaffee, 2013: 240), and an ‘integral part of the govern-
ment of advanced liberal societies’ (Ball, 2011: 97). The UK Cabinet Office has pub-
lished a range of strategies describing how government agencies can build a more
‘resilient society’—such as by publishing risk assessments, developing emergency
response procedures and teaching communities how to respond to crisis (Cabinet Office,
2013a, 2013b, 2014). Given these diverse applications, it is unsurprising that there is
‘considerably less agreement on what “resilience” actually refers to’ (Brassett et al.,
2013: 221). As Brassett et al. (2013: 221) point out, the concept ‘seems to carry a produc-
tive ambiguity that both resists exact definition and allows for a spectrum of
interactions’.
While the academic literature on resilience is extensive in natural hazards studies and
psychology (see, for example, Berkes, 2007; Harvey and Delfabbro, 2004; Hufschmidt,
2011; Manyena, 2006), criminologists have only recently begun to develop a body of
research on the concept and its attendant benefits and dangers. On the one hand, some
criminologists believe it to be an empowering doctrine which can benefit marginalized
groups (Mason and Pulvirenti, 2013; Walklate, 2011). On the other hand, Foucauldian
approaches stress that governments are inculcating self-discipline and legitimizing the
expansion of their own power (Ball, 2011; O’Malley, 2010). These contrasting views
within criminology mimic divisions in the wider literature (see, for example, Coaffee,
2006; Walker and Cooper, 2011).
In particular, the concept has not been addressed in the criminological literature on
counter-terrorism, which to date has focused on how the concepts of risk, security, pre-
caution and pre-emption have shaped coercive legal responses to terrorism (see
McCulloch and Pickering, 2009; Zedner, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). This literature on ‘pre-
crime’ has proved crucial to understanding and critiquing western responses to terrorism
since 9/11, but it does not address more recent developments in which social policy has
operated alongside coercive legal measures as a core component of counter-terrorism
strategy. Indeed, some have argued that resilience is now ‘subsuming and surpassing the
logic of security’ (Neocleous, 2013). This may be putting the point too strongly, as pre-
emptive criminal offences and other coercive legal powers continue to play the lead role
in counter-terrorism practice, but it is nonetheless clear that resilience has become
increasingly important to national security policy (see Walker and Cooper, 2011: 152–
154). To the extent that the concept has been examined in counter-terrorism, this has
taken place within geography and political science rather than criminology (Coaffee,
2006, 2009, 2013; Joseph, 2013; Walker and Cooper, 2011).
This article examines the concept of resilience in the UK government’s responses to
terrorism. In doing so, it asks the following question: given the various definitions of this
concept and its range of applications and effects, what can be said about the circum-
stances in which resilience-building efforts either benefit or harm communities? Put
another way, is it possible to identify any patterns as to which definitions or applications
of the concept are the most problematic?
The article considers this question by examining resilience-building measures in the
UK government’s national strategy for countering terrorism, known as ‘CONTEST’.
CONTEST has officially existed since 2003, but it was first published by the Blair gov-
ernment in 2006 (Home Office, 2006). It was updated by both the Brown government
Hardy
79
(Home Office, 2009) and the Coalition government (Home Office, 2011a). Across all
three versions, CONTEST has comprised four policy strands: Pursue, Prevent, Protect
and Prepare, each of which describes a different response to the threat of terrorism.
Pursue largely corresponds with the UK’s counter-terrorism laws, including policing and
intelligence-gathering, although it includes an international dimension such as training
foreign police and security services (see Home Office, 2011a: 44–56). Prevent is a
national strategy for countering terrorist ideology and religious radicalization. It com-
prises interventions for ‘at risk’ individuals and other community-based strategies for
countering extremism (see Home Office, 2011a: 58–76). Protect focuses on defending
the UK population and critical national infrastructure against terrorist attacks (see Home
Office, 2011a: 78–87) while Prepare refers to emergency response procedures, primarily
for the emergency services but also for communities and businesses (see Cabinet Office,
2013b; Home Office, 2011a: 92–102).
This article focuses on resilience-building measures in Prepare and Prevent. Prepare has
been chosen because resilience is the key guiding principle of that strand (see Home Office,
2011a: 93), and because the development of emergency response procedures is consistent
with the existing literature on resilience in the context of national security (see Coaffee,
2006; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 152–154). Protect is also consistent with this existing lit-
erature, although others have previously examined resilience in that context (Coaffee, 2009).
Pursue is not addressed, despite its crucial role in counter-terrorism practice, because it
focuses on coercive and pre-emptive approaches in the UK’s counter-terrorism laws.
The Prevent strand has been chosen because resilience is a key organizing principle
of that strategy, yet little if any attention has been paid to what the concept means and
how it operates in the context of countering extremism. As the voluminous literature on
the Prevent strategy shows, efforts to counter extremism have become a crucial aspect of
counter-terrorism policy and practice, both in the UK and in other western countries (see,
for example, Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Heath-Kelly, 2012; Kundnani, 2009;
Thomas, 2010; with regard to Australia, see Sentas, 2014). More importantly, efforts to
counter extremism raise some unique issues with regard to resilience which do not arise
in the context of emergency response procedures. As such, Prepare and Prevent provide
two contrasting case studies of resilience that illuminate the benefits and dangers of the
concept as it is defined and applied across different contexts.
This article contributes to the growing literature on resilience and supplements the
existing criminological literature on pre-crime by examining aspects of counter-
terrorism policy which operate alongside the UK’s counter-terrorism laws. It proceeds in
four parts. Part one explores definitions of resilience as well as unresolved issues such as
how these definitions relate to risk and vulnerability. Part two explores the potential
benefits and dangers when resilience is used as an organizing principle for government
policy. Parts three and four consider the contrasting approaches found in Prepare and
Prevent and their attendant benefits and dangers.
What is resilience?
Resilience describes the ability to absorb the impact of, and then recover from, a shock
or disturbance. Commentators in natural hazards studies distinguish two main types:
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Theoretical Criminology 19(1)
engineering resilience and ecological resilience. The former describes the ability of a
material or...
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