Response to Richard Beardsworth's Review of Practical Judgement in International Political Theory
| Date | 01 April 2012 |
| DOI | 10.3366/jipt.2012.0029 |
| Author | Chris Brown |
| Published date | 01 April 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Review Essays: Critical Engagement |
RESPONSE TO RICHARD BEARDSWORTH’S REVIEW OF
PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL THEORY
CHRIS BROWN
Richard Beardsworth provides such a sympathetic and generous reading of
Practical Judgement in International Political Theory that it seems churlish to
raise objections – and the situation is made more difficult for me by the fact
that he has already partially anticipated the line of argument that I will take.
Beardsworth’s thesis is that I am, in effect, offering a theory of international
liberalism, or at least, given the positions I am espousing, I ought to be. He
anticipates, correctly, that I will not accept that this is what I am or should
be doing but suggests that my focus on the dilemmas of liberal principle and
practice and my ‘framework of (cosmopolitan) political judgement avoids. . . the
risk of the renewed constructions of international liberalism in a globalized age’.
In effect, I am refusing a fence that I ought to jump, and am covering up my
refusal by pretending that I can’t actually see the fence, and anyway don’t need
to clear it.
I think this misunderstands what I was trying to do in these essays. To start
with the most important point, Beardsworth is right to say that I have become
more willing to endorse international interventions than I used to be, but I
don’t accept that this involves me in a commitment to ‘international liberalism’
much less ‘cosmopolitanism’. Rather, it involvesa recognition that the values of
solidarity with the oppressed, critical self-awareness and the centrality of rational
discourse are in greater need of assertion than they once were, in particular
given the actions of radical Islamists and their Western fellow-travellers; one
sometimes refers to actions in support of these values as ‘liberal interventions’,
but this is no more than shorthand because the values in question are not simply
liberal values. Thus, for example, the rebels against Gaddafi are standing up for
human decency in the face of a deeply oppressive regime, and they are entitled
to ask our solidarity and practical aid – neither they nor we need to be liberals
to ask for or recognise this entitlement. In the essay on ‘Liberalism and the
Globalization of Ethics’ in which Beardsworth finds me endorsing liberalism, I
Journal of International Political Theory, 8(1–2) 2012, 110–111
DOI: 10.3366/jipt.2012.0029
© Edinburgh University Press 2012
www.eupjournals.com/jipt
110
To continue reading
Request your trial