Reverse Burden and Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights: Drunk in Charge; Terrorism Offence
| Author | Ben Fitzpatrick |
| DOI | 10.1350/jcla.2005.69.6.478 |
| Published date | 01 December 2005 |
| Date | 01 December 2005 |
| Subject Matter | House of Lords |
House of Lords
Reverse Burden and Article 6(2) of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Drunk in Charge;
Terrorism Offence
Sheldrake vDPP; Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 4 of 2002) [2004]
UKHL 43
This was a consolidated appeal. In both cases the central issue was
whether a particular ‘reverse burden’ statutory provision imposed a
legal or an evidential burden on a defendant.
Sheldrake
The respondent had been convicted in June 2001 of being in charge of
a motor vehicle after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of
alcohol in his breath exceeded the prescribed limit, contrary to s. 5(1)(b)
of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘the 1988 Act’).
Section 5 of the 1988 Act provides:
(1) If a person—
...
(b) is in charge of a motor vehicle on a road or other public place,
after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath,
blood or urine exceeds the prescribed limit he is guilty of an offence.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection
(1)(b) above to prove that at the time he is alleged to have committed the
offence the circumstances were such that there was no likelihood of his
driving the vehicle whilst the proportion of alcohol in his breath, blood or
urine remained likely to exceed the prescribed limit.
The justices stated a case for the opinion of the High Court in September
2001. The issues for the consideration of the High Court were:
1. Whether the justices were entitled to be satisfied that the statutory
defence contained within s. 5(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 did
not prima facie interfere with the presumption of innocence con-
tained within Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
2. Whether, if the justices had found that prima facie there had been
an interference with the presumption of innocence, they were
entitled to be satisfied that a legitimate aim was being pursued by
the legislation and that the measure imposed by the statute was
proportionate to achieving that aim.
3. Whether, if the justices had concluded that s. 5(2) did breach
Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, the
court would be able to interpret the legislation in a way that is
compatible with the presumption of innocence by placing only an
evidential burden upon a defendant.
478
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