Review Essay : Armed Forces are not only for War
| Author | Peter Wallensteen |
| Date | 01 March 1982 |
| Published date | 01 March 1982 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338201900107 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Review
Essay:
Armed
Forces
are
not
only
for
War
PETER
WALLENSTEEN
University
of
Michigan
and
Dept.
of
Peace
Research,
University
of
Uppsala
In
two
comprehensive
studies
published
by
the
Brookings
Institution,
the
historical
record
of
US
and
Soviet
uses
of
armed
forces
as
political
instruments
short
of
war-fighting
has
been
documented.
The
two
studies,
although
not
strictly
comparable,
provide
very
valuable
sources
of
similar
events,
the
study
on
the
USA
also
using
an
interesting
technique
for
deciding
the
outcomes.
The
general
overview
is
complemented
with
detailed
studies
of
particular
cases,
as
well
as
a
focus
on
some
situations
where
nuclear
threats
were
used.
The
studies
suggest
that
a
more
limited
American
use
of
force
would
be
advantageous
and
find
that
the
Soviet
Union
uses
force
in
a
cautious
manner.
They
do
not,
however,
question
the
wisdom
of
weapons
use,
and
do
not
systematically
address
questions
of
conflict
escalation
or
conflict
resolution.
However,
as
a
whole,
the
studies
are
a
most
important
contribution
to
peace
research.
During
the
post-1945
period
the
United
States
used
its
armed
forces
for
specific
political
purposes
215
times.
In
a
somewhat
longer
period,
the Soviet
Union
used
its
forces
for
comparable
purposes
in
190
instances.
This
is
the
historical
record
described
in
two
recent
publications
from
the
Washington-based
Brookings
Institution.
In
the
study
Force
without
War.
USA rmed
Forces
as
Political
Instruments
(1978),
Barry
M.
Blechman
and
Stephen
S.
Kaplan
describe
and
evaluate
US
involvements
from
January
1,
1945
to
De-
cember
31,
1975
with
the
help
of
statistical
overviews
and
diplomatic
case
studies.
In
Diplomacy
o,i‘Power.
Soviet
Armed
Forces
as
Political Instruments
(1981),
Stephen
S.
Kap-
lan
compiles
some
overviews
and
presents
eight
different
case
studies
of
corresponding
Soviet
engagements
from
June
1944
to
Au-
gust
1979.
Both
volumes
use
as
their
point
of
departure
an
ambition
to
combine
modern
so-
cial
science
methods
and
historical
accounts
in
order
to
provide
some
insight
into
the
non-
war
uses
of
armed
forces.
The
historical
re-
cord
arrived
at
illustrates
one
of
the
main
points:
armed
forces
exist
not
only
to
wage
war
but
also
to
exert
pressure,
demonstrate
commitment,
and
’project
power’.
Indeed,
given
the
few
war
involvements
of
American
and
Soviet
troops
during
the
post-1945
period,
’political’
uses
seem
more
frequent
than
actual
warfighting.
Although
one
of
the
authors
has
contribut-
ed
to
both
volumes,
each
volume
is
distinctly
different
in
method
and
analysis.
The
Blech-
man/Kaplan
book
embarks
on
an
ambitious
attempt
to
analyse
the
utility
of
the
use
of
force.
Thus,
in
a
detailed
study
using
a
sample
of
the
215
incidents,
an
attempt
is
made
to
reach
general
conclusions
on
the
usefulness
of
the
US
uses
of
armed
forces.
Some
of
the
conclusions
are
quite
striking,
notably
the
finding
that
the
overall
strategic
balance
be-
tween
the Soviet
Union
and
the
United
States
bears
no
systematic
relations
to
the
outcome
of
the
US
use
of
armed
force.
Thus,
un-
favorable
and
favorable
outcomes
(from
the
US
point
of
view)
are
recorded
in
periods
of
nuclear
superiority
as
well
as
under
nuclear
parity,
also
for
incidents
where
the
Soviet
Union
was
a
major
participant.
This
clearly
suggests
that
the
’strength’
searched
for
in
nuclear
weapons
does
not
very
easily
translate
into
policital
utility
in
locally
confined
con-
flicts.
No
similar
utility
analysis
is
attempted
for
the
Soviet
uses
of
armed
forces.
Instead,
the
Soviet
record
is
assessed
in
terms
of
its
im-
plications
for
American
strategy.
Thus,
both
books
are
of
policy
relevance;
the
Blechman/Kaplan
book
in
particular
addresses
the
implicit
question
of
excessive
use
of
American
force,
whereas
the
Kaplan
volume
addresses
the
question
of
unpredic-
table
Soviet
use
of
force.
By
and
large
the
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