Review: A Great Wall
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200005500213 |
| Published date | 01 June 2000 |
| Author | Fred Edwards |
| Date | 01 June 2000 |
| Subject Matter | Review |
REVIEWS
A
GREAT
WALL
Six
Presidents
and
China:
An Investigative
History.
Patrick
Tyler
New
York:
Public
Affairs
for
the
Century
Foundation,
xvi, 476
pp,
us$40.00,
ISBN
1-891620-37-1
PATRICK
TYLER,
A
FORMER
New
York
Times
Beijing
bureau
chief,
makes
the
case
for
pragmatism
and
restraint
in
Washington's
China
policy.
His
history
of
Sino-United
States
relations begins
with
the
Taiwan
Strait
crisis
of
1996
and then
backtracks
to the 1969 Ussuri
River
clashes
before
launching
on
a
narrative
from
the
Nixon
opening
through
to
the
controversies
of
the
past
few
years
-
espionage,
cam-
paign
financing,
trade,
and,
of
course,
Taiwan.
Throughout,
Tyler
makes
an
effort
to
understand
China's
goals
as
well
as
America's.
By
and
large,
he
finds
China's
behaviour
reasonable
and
responsible,
whereas
American
policy
often
is
described
as
short-
sighted
and
risky.
In
Tyler's
telling, the
China
opening
itself
grew
out
of
a
failed
gam-
ble.
He
says
Richard
Nixon
came
into
office
so
keen
on
a
settlement
in
Vietnam
that
he
was
prepared
to
co-operate
with
Moscow
against
China
if
the
Soviet
Union
would
abandon
Hanoi.
Tyler
describes var-
ious
signals
Nixon
sent
to
Moscow
in
early
1969
and
discussions
with-
in
the
administration
about
such
a
trade-off.
For
the
most
part,
Tyler
does
not
present
new
evidence
so
much
as
reinterpret
the
existing
record.
He
draws
attention
to
a
June
1969
presidential
request
for
a
study
on how
the
United
States
might
mount
a
nuclear
attack
on
China, and
a
conversation
between
Nixon
and
his
defence
secretary,
Melvin
Laird,
during
which
Nixon
said
that
a
Soviet
attack
on
China
might
be
a
price
worth
paying for
a
favourable
peace
in
Vietnam.
After it
became
apparent
that
Moscow
was
not
going
to
help
out
in
Vietnam,
however,
there
was
panic
in
Washington.
Might the
Soviet
Union
attack
China
anyway
and
invoke
Nixon's
earlier
statements
about
the
danger
of
Chinese
expansionism?
Nixon
now
saw
any such
Soviet
action
as
a
potential
disaster.
So,
he
reversed
course
and
was
relieved
at
China's
receptiveness
to
a
rapprochement.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
2000
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