Review: International: The Electronic War in the Middle East 1968–70
| Published date | 01 June 1975 |
| Date | 01 June 1975 |
| Author | John Gellner |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070207503000215 |
| Subject Matter | Review |
REVIEWS/INTERNATIONAL
345
weapons
[to
India]
without
making
any of
its
own'
(P
154).
Because
this
is
the
first
book
on
proliferation
to
view
it
in the
specific
context
of
national
politics
and
strategy,
it
is
disappointing
that
Professor
Quester failed
to
stress
the
difference between
this
realistic
view
of
proliferation and
the
theoretical
abstract
arms
con-
trol
model of
proliferation
as
rapid
and
destabilizing.
This
incorrect
model
dominated
United
States policy
towards
the
NPT and
has
shaped
the Canadian debate
on
proliferation.
Arms
controllers,
in
Canada
and
elsewhere,
have
for too
long
neglected
the
political
aspects
of
strategic problems; this
book
should
help
to
remind
them
that
arms
control
is
about
politics.
Robert
Ranger/St
Francis
Xavier
University
THE
ELECTRONIC
WAR IN
THE
MIDDLE
EAST
1968-70
Edgar
O'Ballance
London:
Faber
&
Faber
[Toronto:
Oxford
University
Press],
1974,
148pp,
$14.25
The
main,
and
perhaps
only, value
of
a
book
like
this,
essentially
a
recital
of
day-to-day
events
during
a
certain period,
lies
in
that
it
may
save
one going
through
a
number
of
entries
in
several
volumes
of
Keesing's
Contemporary
Archives
or
of
Facts
on
File.
This
could
be
quite
useful,
and
would
be even
more
so
if the
index
were
more
de-
tailed,
but it
is
surely
not
enough
to
justify
the
publication
of
a
volume
with
the
impressive
title
of
The Electronic
War
in
the
Middle
East
1968-70.
The
title
itself
is
misleading.
Only
one-fifth
of
the
actual
nar-
rative
-
26
of
126
pages
-
deals
with what
the
author
calls
'the
elec-
tronic
war,'
or
'the
electronic
battle,' or
'the
brief
electronic summer,'
a
period
of, at
most,
seven
months
between
January
and
August
1970.
Four-fifths
of
the
book are
devoted
to
descriptions
of
the
sporadic
fighting
on the
Suez
Canal
front
which
began
immediately
after
the
armistice
ending the
Six-Day
War
and
then
escalated
to
the
'war
of
attrition,'
as
President
Nasser
called
it,
up
to
-
and,
in
a
few
pages,
beyond
-
the
Rogers
Plan
ceasefire
of
7
August
1970.
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