Review: Nuclear Strategy in the Twenty-First Century
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200105600312 |
| Author | Aurel Braun |
| Date | 01 September 2001 |
| Published date | 01 September 2001 |
| Subject Matter | Review |
Reviews
NUCLEAR
STRATEGY
IN
THE
TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Stephen
J.
Cimbala
Westport
CT:
Praeger,
2000,
xiii,
211
pp,
US$65.00,
ISBN
0-275-
96869-3
D
espite
the
end
of
the
cold
war
and
the best
efforts
of
arms
control
proponents,
nuclear weapons
not
only
remain
in
the
arsenals
of
the
old
nuclear
powers,
but
several
states, led by
governments
of
dubi-
ous
stability,
are
seeking
to
join
the
club.
Since
the
beginning
of
the
nuclear
age
though,
nuclear weapons
have
had an
uneasy
fit
in
strate-
gy
and
foreign
policy.
Fascination
and
phobia
have
clouded
the
judg-
ments
of
both
policy-makers
and
scholars
in
assessing
the
utility
of
nuclear
weapons
even
during
the
height
of
the
cold
war
when
the
two
superpowers
risked
their
survival
to
protect
their
ideology.
If
one
is
to
understand
the
role
of
nuclear weapons
in
what
Edward
Luttwak
called
the
'postnuclear'
era
and
others
call
the
era
of
the
'third
wave' or
postindustrial
or
cyber
warfare,
then
an evaluation
of
the
present
and
the
future should
also
benefit
from
a
re-examination
of
the
past.
In
a
work
rich in detail,
Stephen
Cimbala
provides
a
seamless
exam-
ination
of
the
past,
present,
and
future
and
argues
cogently that
nuclear
arsenals
will
continue
to
play
a
role,
but
in
a
highly
nuanced
and
situation-specific
fashion.
He
dissects
the
intricacies
of
nuclear
deterrence
and
provides valuable
insights
into
a
number
of
past
devel-
opments,
including the
Cuban
missile
crisis
of
1962
and
nuclear
arms
control
agreements.
In
the
last
part
of
the
book
he
not
only provides
a
counter-intuitive
analysis
of
policy
and
strategy,
but
also
challenges
policy-makers
and
especially
scholars
to
think
in
broad
and
innovative
ways
about
nuclear
strategy
in an
era
that
in
key
respects
is
and
will
be
considerably
less
stable
and
predictable.
Throughout
the
book,
Cimbala
makes
commendable
efforts
at
balance.
He
is,
however,
per-
haps
overly
generous
in
assessing
Robert
McNamara's
'moderating'
role
in the
Cuban
missile
crisis
when
others
might
suggest
that
the
sec-
retary
of
defense
exhibited
not
only
considerable
intellectual shallow-
ness
but
also
a
remarkably
poor
understanding
of
general
strategy.
Similarly,
in assigning
shared blame
to
the American
and
Soviet
administrations
in
the
Cuban
missile
crisis,
Cimbala
may
well
have
underestimated Nikita
Khrushchev's
penchant
for
'quick
fix'
solutions
and
'clever'
turns
of
policy
that
backfired
both
domestically
and inter-
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Summer2001
535
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