Review: The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence
| Published date | 01 March 1998 |
| Date | 01 March 1998 |
| DOI | 10.1177/136571279800200205 |
| Author | Mike Redmayne |
| Subject Matter | Review |
REVIEW
National Research Council Committee on DNA Forensic Science
THE EVALUATION
OF
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE
Washington DC: National Academy Press
(1996)
xv
+
254
pp,
hb,
f30.95
In 1992. while the use of
DNA
evidence in the
US
courts was the subject of
considerable controversy, a Committee established by the National Research
Council
(NRC)
published a report on the use of
DNA
technology in forensic
science. The report proposed, among other things, a set of criteria for the
calculation of
DNA
match probabilities which, it was hoped, would allay the
fears of some of the critics of
DNA
evidence while still allowing such evidence
to be used in the courts.
As
it turned out, the first
NRC
report
(NRCl)
did not
end the controversy over
DNA
evidence, indeed, at times it seemed only to
have exacerbated it. Now a second report on
DNA
evidence has been
published under the auspices of the
NRC
(NRC2), updating the
recommendations of
NRCl
on the computation of
DNA
match probabilities.
In the four years between the publication of the two reports much has
happened: the ongoing process of research into forensic genetics has lessened
fears that the genetic structure of human populations invalidates the
theoretical assumptions underlying match probability calculation. In turn,
this has shifted the focus of the
DNA
debate to other matters, in particular
laboratory procedures and juror comprehension of probabilistic evidence.
While the most important recommendations of NRC2 consist of some fairly
esoteric equations for match probability calculation, the report is of wider
interest because it is.
for
the most part, a salutary example of how to cope
with disagreements about novel scientific techniques. Two closely connected
themes run through the new report: the need to reconcile scientific and legal
concerns; and the need to acknowledge uncertainty. The report acknowledges
that many of its recommendations are informed by policy concerns, leading
it to take a particular approach to uncertainty. Thus, NRC2 notes that its
recommendations are structured by the criminal standard of proof and that
they should not necessarily be applied in civil litigation (p.
54).
Where there is
uncertainty, the recommendations in
NRC2
generally err on the side of
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF
EVIDENCE
&
PROOF
136
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