Review: The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons
| Published date | 01 March 2010 |
| Date | 01 March 2010 |
| Author | David Tal |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070201006500119 |
| Subject Matter | Coming AttractionsReview |
| International Journal | Winter 2009-10 | 265 |
| Reviews |
THE TRADITION OF NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
T.V. Paul
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 336pp, US$29.95 paper
ISBN 978-0804761321
In the none-too-long history of nuclear weapons, two facts are striking:
first, unlike any other weapon, this one was used only twice, shortly after it
became operative, and then not for more than six decades. Second, despite
the weapon’s apparent non-usability, not only have nuclear disarmament
talks completely failed, but some nations are still trying to join the nuclear
club. The reasons for this are complicated and it is easier to explain why
nuclear weapons were not used after August 1945: the horror of the nuclear
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of such magnitude, and the long-
term damage from a nuclear attack would be so extensive, that over the last
64 years no one has dared to use such a weapon of mass destruction.
T.V. Paul accepts these reasons for the non-use of nuclear weapons but
argues that there are still questions to be answered. We can understand why
the nuclear powers did not use nuclear weapons against each other. Such was
the power of deterrence. But why did nuclear powers not use these weapons
when they became entangled in bloody conflicts with nonnuclear states?
The example of the US in Vietnam is the most notable case. In an attempt to
address this problem, and despite the fact that he is a political scientist, Paul
rejects the “purely paradigm driven approach” as an answer (3). The reasons
for non-use defy a single explanation, because nuclear weapons were never
formally banned in the way that chemical and biological weapons were.
Explaining the informal norm of non-use calls for a nuanced approach that
takes into account a number of factors that go beyond a single grand theory.
One of the explanations that Paul cites is the horrendous impact of
nuclear weapons. This is the logic of consequences. With the passing years,
non-use also became a matter of tradition. These two forces—the logic
of consequences and the tradition of non-use—fixed the nuclear non-use
policy even when there seemed to be some logic that called for a nuclear
attack. Tradition, continues Paul, was based to great extent on reputation.
This is a twofold argument. On the one hand, the non-use of nuclear
weapons preserved peace through deterrence and justified the nuclear
monopoly of the US and USSR, even as these countries campaigned for
nuclear nonproliferation. On the other hand, using nuclear weapons “would
show the use in an excessively bad light in international public opinion” (3).
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