REVIEWS
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1989.tb02599.x |
| Date | 01 January 1989 |
| Published date | 01 January 1989 |
REVIEWS
LAW
AS
A
MORAL
JUDGMENT.
By DERYCK BEYLEVELD
and
ROGER
BROWNSWORD.
[London:
Sweet
&
Maxwell,
1986. 483pp.,
hardback,
f35.00.1
IT
is possible, perhaps only too conveniently, to forget sometimes that that
section of the jurisprudence course which is generally categorised under
the rubric of natural law theory has undergone considerable reappraisal
in
recent years. The strategies of modernisation to which natural law theory
has of late been subjected seem to be far more radical and innovative than
the counterpart contemporary reappraisals of legal positivism. Indeed this
is
so
much the case that,
in
the context of the modern jurisprudence
syllabus, it seems totally unsatisfactory nowadays to teach natural law
theory as
if
it warranted little more than prolusory treatment, that is, as
if
it constituted nothing but a quaint detour of possible historical interest
en
route
to the more contemporary and-so, generally, the assumption goes-
more important location of late nineteenth and twentieth-century,
principally positivist jurisprudence.
In
1980,
John Finnis' book,
Natural Law and Natural
Rights
was
published. This book constitutes an exposition of a particular theory
of
natural law, though
it
is not, according to its author, a book about natural
law as a general discipline. This much stated, nevertheless, Finnis does
find occasion
in
Natural Law and Natural
Rights
to speak
on
behalf of
others, most notably in his formidable defence of Aquinas. Nothing like
this is to be found
in
Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownswords'
Law
as
a
Moral Judgment.
Apart from
Lon
Fuller, Iredell Jenkins, and Finnis
himself, no other natural lawyers are discussed throughout this book.
In
fact, everything that comes under discussion
in
Law as a Moral Judgment
is treated
with
the single purpose of clarifying and strengthening Beyleveld
and Brownswords' own particular version of natural law theory. Indeed it
seems to me that,
if
one is to attempt to evaluate the arguments set out
in
this book, one must first of all appreciate the fixity
of
purpose that
so
clearly underscores
it.
Unlike some co-authored academic texts,
Law
as
Moral Judgment
is
very clearly the creation of two legal theorists working mutually,
dialectically, and indeed single-mindedly. That this is
so
can be discerned
from
the
general style of the book. First, both
in
grammar and argument,
it is extremely precise. Sometimes this results
in
an admirable clarity,
especially when Beyleveld and Brownsword are developing their own
position in the early stages of
the
book. But
on
too many occasions it
leads to over-protracted exposition, whereby the authors,
in
order to cover
their position from all angles, try to deal (usually at considerable length)
with
every possible objection to their argument. Often this is necessary,
for Beyleveld and Brownswords' argument is far from uncontentious.
Sometimes, however, their prolixity proves counter-productive: lengthy
'analyses outstay their welcome and thereby lose their impact. This,
I
suspect, is simply the result of two minds trying concertedly to work as
one, each endeavouring to cover the tracks of the other, as it were.
In
addition to this, however, despite their apparent counter intention
(cf.
p.30), Beyleveld and Brownsword exacerbate an already dense style
of
presentation by making frequent use of cipher-like, algebraic formulae
in
139
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