Revisiting the semi-consociational model: Democratic failure in prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq
| Author | Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512119871321 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119871321
International Political Science Review
2020, Vol. 41(1) 108 –123
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512119871321
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Revisiting the semi-consociational
model: Democratic failure in
prewar Lebanon and post-
invasion Iraq
Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif
Holy Spirit University of Kaslik, Kaslik, Jounieh, Lebanon
Abstract
This article revisits the concept of semi-consociational democracy and distinguishes it from full
consociationalism. Semi-consociationalism features just two of the characteristics of full consociationalism,
proportionality and segmental autonomy, and exists without strong grand coalitions and veto powers. The
case studies of prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq demonstrate this new category of power sharing,
which relies on three conditions: concentration of executive powers in the presidential office (prewar
Lebanon) or premiership (post-invasion Iraq), communal hegemony in the system, and communal control
over the armed forces. Full consociationalism then is mistakenly blamed for democratic failure in these two
case studies.
Keywords
Prewar Lebanon, post-invasion Iraq, consociationalism, semi-consociationalism, armed forces, executive,
hegemony
Introduction
This article argues that prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq are ideal-type examples of semi-
consociationalism, not full consociationalism – as per the academic classification – and it is this
distinction that helps to explain why these cases ended in instability and conflict and not in peace
and stability, as consociational theory would anticipate. In both cases, the characteristics of semi-
consociationalism are able to empower one group, allowing it to become the hegemon. These two
cases are similar because the record shows that they had failed (as in prewar Lebanon) or are failing
(as in post-invasion Iraq). The two examples provide plenty of evidence about the politics of inclu-
sion amid exclusion, a new and noble theme in the study of power sharing.
Corresponding author:
Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, Higher Institute of Political Science, Holy Spirit University of Kaslik, Kaslik, Jounieh, 96111,
Lebanon.
Email: Eduardoaboultaif@usek.edu.lb
871321IPS0010.1177/0192512119871321International Political Science ReviewAboultaif
research-article2019
Special Issue Article
Aboultaif 109
Consociational democracy is a form of government applied in deeply divided societies which
aims at achieving political stability. A consociation is considered to be an accommodationist option
that manages divisions in ethnically plural states (McGarry et al., 2008: 52–3). Such divisions tend
to lead to winner-take-all competition between elites, which further exacerbates divisions and
inevitably leads to instability (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005: 29). Therefore, a majoritarian democracy
is likely to be unsuitable for such societies, as it allows for a dominant group or coalition to con-
centrate and capture state power, relegating the minority into permanent opposition (Bogaards,
2006: 119).
Consociationalism is typically associated with the work of Arend Lijphart, who outlines four
core features of the model: government by grand coalition or executive power sharing, veto rights
for the different groups, proportionality, and a high degree of autonomy for each segment (Lijphart,
1977: 25). A second generation of scholars, such as John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, have
picked up this principle of democracy and further developed and refined it by introducing the role
of external actors in promoting consociationalism and by articulating the distinction between lib-
eral and corporate forms of consociationalism. By considering the role of external actors, McGarry
and O’Leary have taken the field from an exclusive focus on internal factors to theorizing the influ-
ence of both positive and negative external factors. Moreover, the novel distinction between liberal
and corporate consociation, which turns on whether the groups who are to share power are pre-
determined or self-determined, helps to refine our understanding of the different ways in which
consociational systems can be designed (McGarry and O’Leary, 2007).
A critical evaluation of consociational practice shows that it has a mixed track record. While
some have managed to facilitate political stability in divided places, it has also led to disastrous
failure in other places, such as prewar Lebanon1 and post-invasion Iraq.2 These two cases are used
as evidence to show that consociationalism does not necessarily lead to political stability. However,
to what extent is this claim true? Are these two cases full consociations or do they have some fea-
tures of consociationalism? If indeed prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq are examples of
consociational failure, does this suggest that the outcome of these cases will happen elsewhere? If
so, should we abandon the consociational model?
A careful review of prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq demonstrates that neither of these
cases represents full consociations. Instead, they are examples of what I call semi-consociational-
ism. Both have proportionality and strong cultural/segmental autonomy, but their coalition govern-
ments are weak and in both cases there is a complete absence of the mutual veto. Given the critical
importance of grand coalitions and veto rights to power-sharing logic, their absence changes the
dynamic of the system. Instead of preventing the permanent domination of the majority over the
minority, semi-consociations become dominated by the strongest or biggest group. Semi-
consociations, that is, are defined by the concentration of executive powers in the presidential or
prime ministerial office, the presence of a communal hegemon in the system with the ability to
subordinate other groups, and finally communal control of the armed forces (e.g. the Lebanese
president controlled the Lebanese army and the Iraqi prime minister controls the Iraqi army).
The civil war that destroyed the Lebanese model was put to an end by the Taif Accord that
transformed the political system into a full consociation,3 which shows that the prewar Lebanese
case was a failure, while post-invasion Iraq is suffering from security challenges and continuous
instability that threatens the unity of the state itself. Both cases acquire the characteristics of semi-
consociationalism that distinguish them from a full consociation. I start by explaining the distinc-
tion between semi-consociationalism and full-consociational democracies. I then move on to
conceptualize semi-consociationalism as a weak power sharing system based on proportionality
and autonomy, with a ceremonial grand coalition that lacks mutual vetoes. I then demonstrate the
impact that semi-consociationalism has on intergroup relations, using two cases: prewar Lebanon
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