Revolutionary Attitudes in Democratic Regimes
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| Author | Raul Magni-Berton,Abel François,Simon Varaine |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321719874362 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719874362
Political Studies
2021, Vol. 69(2) 214 –236
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321719874362
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Revolutionary Attitudes in
Democratic Regimes
Abel François1, Raul Magni-Berton2
and Simon Varaine3
Abstract
Contrary to a classic prediction of democratic theory, empirical studies do not find that democratic
systems produce internal peace. This absence of relationship does not mean that democratic
theory is entirely wrong. Indeed, democratic systems may have a negative effect on the support for
revolution, as predicted by democratic theory, but a positive effect on opportunities for revolutions
on the other part. Focusing on the support for revolution in 15 European democracies, this article
re-examines the classic prediction that democratic systems reduce political grievances. This rests
on three arguments: that (1) majority rule guarantees that the number of dissatisfied people is
relatively low, (2) periodic elections allow dissatisfied people to hope for a change in the leadership
within a reasonable period of time, and (3) power-sharing institutions diminish the negative impact
of an unwanted government on people. We find empirical support for all arguments. In addition
to shedding light on the reasons why democracy weakens revolutionary attitudes, our analysis
provides some clues to understand the recent increase in the support for revolution in democratic
countries.
Keywords
democracy, revolutionary attitudes, internal conflict, public opinion, loser consent
Accepted: 16 August 2019
Introduction
A core assumption of democratic theory is that democratic institutions encourage internal
peace (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Przeworski, 1999). Democratic systems have for
long been thought to temper internal conflicts by limiting the number of political losers
and managing their consent (Anderson et al., 2005; Popper, 2014 [1963]). Specifically,
three definitional features of democratic systems should reduce political grievances
1Lille University, LEM, Lille, and Sciences Po LIEPP, Paris, France
2Université Grenoble Alpes, Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE and Sciences Po LIEPP, Grenoble, France
3Université Grenoble Alpes, Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE, Grenoble, France
Corresponding author:
Raul Magni-Berton, Université Grenoble Alpes, Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE and Sciences Po LIEPP, 1030
Avenue Centrale, 38400 Saint-Martin-d’Hères, Paris, France.
Email: raul.magniberton@iepg.fr
874362PSX0010.1177/0032321719874362Political StudiesFrançois et al.
research-article2019
Article
François et al. 215
compared to autocratic systems. First, democracies are based on majority rule, which
limits the number of people ruled by an unwanted government (Rae, 1969; Taylor, 1969).
Second, democracies hold periodic elections; hence, people losing an election are aware
that an institutional mechanism exists to remove the leader (Przeworski, 1999). Finally,
democracies encompass power-sharing institutions, which guarantee that the electoral
losers do not lose too much (Lijphart, 1977).
However, empirical comparisons between democracies and non-democratic regimes do
not clearly support the view that democracies produce internal peace. Some scholars find
an inverted-U shape relationship between level of democracy and the probability of onset
of internal armed conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre, 2014; Muller and Weede,
1990), while others find no relationship (Vreeland, 2008) or a slight monotonic or condi-
tional relationship (Bartusevičius and Skaaning, 2018; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010).
These surprising results seem to be in contradiction with democratic theory.
This article argues that it is not and that democratic theory is correct in predicting that
democratic systems lower revolutionary attitudes, that is, the citizens’ preference for
existing structures to be overturned by insurgency (MacCulloch, 2003). Indeed, the
inconsistent effect of democracy on internal conflicts could reflect two inverted effects
of democracy, on revolutionary attitudes on the one hand and revolutionary behaviors on
the other, which is the actual mobilization into insurgent organizations that seek to over-
throw existing structures. On the one hand, democratic systems lower individuals’ moti-
vations to overthrow their institutions by providing opportunities to lawfully defend
their ideas. These motivations are mainly due to economic or social factors, such as
poverty or inequality (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003), but they are
also influenced by the institutions which distribute political power. On the other hand, as
democracies do not repress social movements, preparing armed insurgencies is easier.
This means that while democratic institutions produce weaker individual motivations for
insurgency (called “revolutionary attitudes” in this article), they also ease the emergence
of political movements, including insurgencies (we call them “revolutionary behaviors”;
Collier and Rohner, 2008; Hegre, 2014). This conjecture is consistent with what
MacCulloch and Pezzini (2010) found using survey data: the level of freedom in a coun-
try monotonically reduces revolutionary attitudes. Experimental evidence also shows
that political repression and lack of freedom increase revolutionary attitudes but decrease
actual revolutionary behaviors (Abbink and Pezzini, 2005). Finally, in wealthy coun-
tries—where the cost of controlling potentially insurgent organizations is lower—the
relationship between democracies and internal peace is monotonic (Collier and Rohner,
2008; Gleditsch et al., 2009).
In this article, we advance the examination of the mechanisms that lead democratic
institutions to reduce revolutionary attitudes. We aim to empirically re-examine the clas-
sic arguments derived from democratic theory: that is, that (1) majority rule, (2) periodic
elections, and (3) power-sharing institutions reduce revolutionary attitudes. While studies
on revolutionary attitudes have so far compared democracies to autocracies (Abbink and
Pezzini, 2005; MacCulloch and Pezzini, 2010), this article takes an alternative approach
by focusing on the variation in revolutionary attitudes among democracies. Indeed, the
three arguments derived from democratic theory also yield direct predictions on the vari-
ation in revolutionary attitudes among democratic systems themselves. These hypotheses
imply that revolutionary attitudes are triggered (1) by losing out electorally, (2) by the
probability of being the electoral winner in the near future, and (3) by the extent of power
lost by the electoral losers.
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