Rising regional powers meet the global leader: A strategic analysis of influence competition
| Author | Sung Eun Kim,Johannes Urpelainen |
| Published date | 01 March 2015 |
| Date | 01 March 2015 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0192512113504335 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Political Science Review
2015, Vol. 36(2) 214 –234
© The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0192512113504335
ips.sagepub.com
Rising regional powers meet the
global leader: A strategic analysis
of influence competition
Sung Eun Kim
Columbia University, USA
Johannes Urpelainen
Columbia University, USA
Abstract
Emerging regional powers, such as Brazil and India, are reshaping world politics. We conduct a game-
theoretic analysis to examine how growing regional powers compete for influence against a global power,
such as the United States, in different circumstances. If the global power regards dominant positions in
different regions as strategic substitutes (complements), a stronger regional power in region A increases
(decreases) the global power’s efforts to dominate in region B. For example, if Iran grows stronger, the
United States should increase its efforts to secure energy resources in Central Asia as substitutes for Middle
Eastern oil. Conversely, suppose the United States fails to create support for stringent intellectual property
rights protection in Latin America because Brazil opposes new rules. In this case, we expect the United
States to have fewer incentives to create support in other regions because intellectual property rights rules
are most valuable when they constitute a complementary global standard.
Keywords
Hegemony, influence competition, international cooperation, power politics, regionalism
Introduction
Emerging regional powers are reshaping world politics. In Asia, the rapidly growing economic and
military power of China and India threatens the previously hegemonic position of the United States
(Christensen, 2006). In Latin America, Brazil now competes with the United States for the hearts
and minds of the surrounding countries (Bandeira, 2006). In Eastern Europe, Russia has used the
Corresponding author:
Johannes Urpelainen, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, 712 IAB, New York, NY 10027, USA.
Email: ju2178@columbia.edu
504335IPS0010.1177/0192512113504335International Political Science ReviewKim and Urpelainen
research-article2014
Article
Kim and Urpelainen 215
threat of suspending gas supplies to ensure that its neighbours do not align with the European
Union and the United States against Russia’s geopolitical interests (Finon and Locatelli, 2008).
How does influence competition between a global power, such as the United States, and the
emerging regional powers affect political-economic outcomes at the international level? When can
we expect regional powers to strive for dominance in their geographic surroundings, and how does
this affect a global power’s grand strategy? Although the extant literature recognises the impor-
tance of rising regional powers (Bandeira, 2006; Chin, 2010; Christensen, 2006; Shambaugh,
2004/2005; Walt, 2009), it does not answer these questions. Given the rapidly growing prominence
of regional powers in the shadow of American hegemony, this omission is both theoretically and
empirically troubling. The power transition literature identifies the rise of dissatisfied states as the
most war-prone condition but does not explore influence competition between dominant and chal-
lenging powers short of major wars (Kugler and Lemke, 1997; Organski and Kugler, 1980).
To fill this research gap, we develop a game-theoretic model of influence competition between
a global power and regional powers. In the model, the global power has strategic interests in mul-
tiple regions while the regional powers are primarily interested in their own surroundings. Within
each region, the global and regional powers compete over the political-economic alignments of
smaller states. The equilibrium analysis allows us to characterise the regional and global ramifica-
tions of power shifts within one region.
We adopt a game-theoretic approach because it helps understand the consequences of strategic
interaction between the global and regional powers, as well as the third parties who can choose
how to align themselves between the two competitors. To explain and predict the nature of influ-
ence competition in a world of regions, it does not suffice to describe the incentives of regional
challengers (Bandeira, 2006) or describe recent developments (Chin, 2010). Outcomes depend on
the joint effect of multiple strategies, and each player considers the responses of others to their
strategies. As Christensen (2006) finds, for example, traditional approaches to interactions between
China and the United States in East Asia are not, because of lacking nuance, enough to explain
current strategies. Game theory allows us to tease out the potentially complex consequences of
interactions among multiple players in a deductively valid fashion, thus complementing available
case studies and policy analyses.
We find that the consequences of emerging regional powers depend on the strategic interests of
the global power. If the global power regards dominant positions in different regions as strategic
substitutes, an increase in the capabilities of a regional power in region A will increase the global
power’s efforts to consolidate its dominance in region B. For example, if the United States is inter-
ested in a secure oil supply and China successfully challenges it in Central Asia, our model predicts
that the United States should increase efforts to secure reliable oil supplies in other regions, such
as Africa and the Middle East.
But if the global power regards dominant positions in different regions as strategic comple-
ments, an increase in the capabilities of a regional power in region A will decrease the global
power’s efforts to consolidate its dominance in region B. For example, if the United States attempts
to combat violations of intellectual property rights (IPR) but Brazil manages to lure other Latin
American countries to oppose the stringent rules that the United States proposes, then the United
States should reduce efforts to combat such violations in other regions. After all, successful poli-
cies in other regions would simply result in a global shift in piracy and copyright violations from
other regions to Latin America.1
The model offers a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the study of international rela-
tions. Theoretically, the model begins to address the previously neglected issue of regional power
dynamics. While the Cold War era and the following ‘unipolar moment’ inspired much important
theorising about global hegemony (Gilpin, 1981; Kindleberger, 1986; Lake, 1993) and political
To continue reading
Request your trial