Rogues, degenerates, and heroes: Disobedience as politics in military organizations
| Author | Sarah E Parkinson,Eric Hundman |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066118823891 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118823891
European Journal of
International Relations
2019, Vol. 25(3) 645 –671
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066118823891
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JR
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Rogues, degenerates, and
heroes: Disobedience as
politics in military
organizations
Eric Hundman
NYU Shanghai, China
Sarah E Parkinson
Johns Hopkins University, USA
Abstract
Disobedience in military organizations affects critical outcomes such as the quality of
civil–military relations, the likelihood of civilian abuse, and battlefield effectiveness.
Existing work on military disobedience focuses on group dynamics; this article instead
investigates the circumstances under which individual officers disobey. We argue
that officers interpret military orders based on their concurrent positions in multiple
social networks and that, contingent on the soldier’s environment, such orders can
“activate” tensions between overlapping social network identifications. These tensions
create motivations and justifications for disobedience. We develop this theory via in-
depth case studies of individual officers’ disobedience in the Chinese military and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), combined with an examination of 10 additional
cases outlined in an online appendix. Relying on primary sources, we demonstrate how
identifications with overlapping social networks led two ostensibly dissimilar officers
to disobey in similar ways during the Sino-French War (1883–1885) and the Lebanese
Civil War (1975–1989). Our theory thus shows how overlapping social networks
create conditions of possibility for even well-trained, loyal commanders to disobey
their superiors. In doing so, it highlights the critical fact that even within the context
of intensive military discipline and socialization, individuals draw on identifications with
varied social networks to make decisions. Further, it implies that individual disobedience
should be studied as conceptually separate from collective events such as mass desertion
or unit defection.
Corresponding author:
Eric Hundman, Division of Arts and Sciences, NYU Shanghai, 1555 Century Avenue, Room 1226, Shanghai,
200122, China.
Email: eric.hundman@nyu.edu
823891EJT0010.1177/1354066118823891European Journal of International RelationsHundman and Parkinson
research-article2019
Article
646 European Journal of International Relations 25(3)
Keywords
China, discipline, disobedience, military organizations, non-state actors, Palestine,
socialization, social networks
Introduction
On June 22, 1941, the 2nd Panzer Army of Germany’s Third Reich invaded Russia under
General Heinz Guderian’s command. Guderian was a highly trained, wealthy, respected
member of a tight-knit military family. His father was a prominent commander; Heinz
served in the General Staff during the First World War and was central to German mili-
tary thought in the interwar years (Koch, 2003). The general reached the Moscow area
on December 1 (Biesinger, 2006: 432), where frigid weather battered his forces. While
Adolf Hitler’s orders dictated that German forces in Russia were to hold fast, Guderian
believed withdrawal strategically necessary. He met with Hitler on December 20 to ask
for an exception. Hitler refused, ordering Guderian to dig in. Guderian subsequently
disobeyed Hitler’s order and led a retreat, reportedly telling his commander: “I will lead
my army in these unusual circumstances in such a manner that I can answer for it to my
conscience” (Evans, 2009: 212).
Existing research struggles to explain cases like Guderian’s. Scholarship tends to
focus on militaries’ obedience to civilian authority, disciplinary outcomes for low-rank-
ing soldiers (Richards, 2018), or aggregate predictors of disobedience, such as insuffi-
cient training or lack of social cohesion (Castillo, 2014; Manekin, 2013; Rose, 1982;
Shils and Janowitz, 1948). Yet, insubordination like Guderian’s — an act of strategy and
conscience rooted in obligation to the men under his command — implies different
causal processes. An overarching lack of training or poor physical conditions might
explain patterns of civilian abuse or the prevalence of desertion. But, why do highly
trained, experienced soldiers disobey certain operational orders even as they follow
others?
Individual disobedience may express anything from personal opportunism, to strate-
gic brilliance, to principled resistance. However, disobedience such as Guderian’s can
also be considered conceptually distinct from mere insubordination; it is based on both
military and social norms that officers feel obligated to observe because of their posi-
tions. In order to study officer-level disobedience, we build a theory using in-depth case
studies of disobedience — that is, refusals to obey direct orders from the chain of com-
mand — by well-trained, high-ranking, experienced officers. We compare the decision-
making trajectories and relational environments of two otherwise vastly dissimilar
people: one a commander in the Chinese military; the other an officer in a Palestinian
militant organization. Using primary sources, including military records, memoirs, and
interviews, we show that overlap between formal military command structures and other
social networks — including informal intra-military networks — can generate tensions
that make officers’ disobedience more likely. Specifically, we contend that disobedience
becomes possible when three factors are present: An officer: (1) inhabits a formal role
within a military hierarchy; and (2) receives an explicit order via that hierarchy; which
(3) activates an identification with a second role nested in a different set of relations.
When these factors coincide, contradictory imperatives may lead to disobedience.
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