Role conflict: Canada’s withdrawal from combat operations against ISIL
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702017723357 |
| Published date | 01 September 2017 |
| Author | Justin Massie,Laura Pelletier |
| Date | 01 September 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Scholarly Essay
Role conflict: Canada’s
withdrawal from combat
operations against ISIL
Laura Pelletier
Science politique, Universite
´du Que
´bec a
`Montre
´al, Que
´bec,
Canada
Justin Massie
Science politique, Universite
´du Que
´bec a
`Montre
´al, Que
´bec,
Canada
Abstract
This paper seeks to understand the peculiarity of the Trudeau government’s decision to
withdraw Canadian fighter jets from Iraq and Syria. Most studies have focused on
electoral turnover to account for early withdrawal from coalition operations. Yet no
study offers a plausible explanation for why a centrist challenger, such as Trudeau,
favoured early withdrawal despite public support and alliance pressure for continued
involvement, and committed when in power to a bolder and riskier mission while
withdrawing valued military assets from coalition operations. Building on foreign
policy role theory, we argue that role conflict best explains the particularity of the
Trudeau government’s withdrawal decision. In the wake of the 2015 federal election,
the Liberal Party of Canada witnessed an intra-party conflict over which role to perform
between that of a faithful ally and a good international citizen. The party leader finally
proposed a compromise mission making Canada more involved on the frontlines.
Keywords
Iraq, Syria, faithful ally, good international citizen, national role conflict, ISIL
Four months after the 13 November terrorist attack in Paris, while many members
of the multinational coalition led by the United States (US) against the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were upgrading their contributions, the
Canadian Liberal government decided to withdraw the country’s fighter jets
International Journal
2017, Vol. 72(3) 298–317
!The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0020702017723357
journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx
Corresponding author:
Laura Pelletier, Science politique, Universite
´du Que
´bec a
`Montre
´al, 400, rue Sainte-Catherine Est Pavillon
Hubert Aquin, Local A-3405, Montreal, Quebec, H2L 2C5, Canada.
Email: laurapelletierb@gmail.com
from combat operations in Iraq and Syria. Ending the Canadian airstrikes was a
campaign promise made by the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC)’s new leader, Justin
Trudeau. This turn of events should not have been surprising, given that previous
studies have demonstrated that a change of the political leadership makes prema-
ture withdrawal from coalition operations more likely.
1
Yet the new government’s
decision caused much disbelief because of its peculiarity: a majority of
Canadians—including Liberal voters—and former Liberal cabinet ministers
supported the continuation of Canadian combat operations against ISIL, and the
withdrawal of Canada’s fighter-bombers was offset by the tripling of Canada’s
ground troop contribution in Iraq in a riskier ‘‘advise and assist’’ mission.
This paper seeks to understand the peculiarity of the Liberal government’s
decision to withdraw Canadian fighter jets from Iraq and Syria. Most studies
have focused on electoral turnover to account for early withdrawal from coalition
operations. Although the occurrence of a national election serves as a good
predictor of the likeliness of premature withdrawal, the reasons for that likeliness
remain unclear. Some argue that incumbent governments are more likely to exit a
US-led coalition when facing a challenger who opposes military support.
2
Others
find that it is the change in political leadership which better accounts for early
withdrawal, when new leaders hold different beliefs with regard to involvement in
military interventions,
3
especially if they are left-oriented.
4
Still others contend that
elite consensus, public opposition, and minimal risk of damaging the bilateral
relationship with the US better explain decisions to withdraw.
5
Yet no study
offers a plausible explanation for why a centrist challenger, such as the LPC,
favoured early withdrawal despite public support and alliance pressure for contin-
ued involvement, and committed to a bolder and riskier mission while withdrawing
valued military assets from coalition operations. Making sense of this decision will
inform a better understanding of the impact of national elections on democracies’
conflict behaviour.
Building on foreign policy role theory, we argue that role conflict best explains
the particularity of the Trudeau government’s withdrawal decision. In the wake of
the 2015 federal election, the LPC witnessed an intra-party conflict over which
role to perform between that of a faithful ally and a good international citizen.
Trudeau pulled his party towards the good international citizen role and away from
the faithful ally role because of his reluctance towards combat operations.
1. Ulrich Pilster, Tobias Bo
¨hmelt and Atsushi Tago, ‘‘Political leadership changes and the withdrawal
from military coalition operations, 1945–2001,’’ International Studies Perspectives 16, no. 4
(November 2015): 463–483.
2. Atsushi Tago, ‘‘When are democratic friends unreliable? The unilateral withdrawal of troops from
the ‘coalition of the willing’,’’ Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 2 (March 2009): 219–234.
3. Pilster, Bo
¨hmelt and Tago, ‘‘Political leadership changes.’’
4. Brian C. Rathbun, Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the
Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
5. Jason W. Davidson, ‘‘Heading for the exits: Democratic allies and withdrawal from Iraq and
Afghanistan,’’ Democracy and Security 10, no. 3 (August 2014): 251–286; Justin Massie, ‘‘Public
contestation and policy resistance: Canada’s oversized military commitment to Afghanistan,’’
Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 1 (January 2016): 47–65.
Pelletier and Massie 299
To continue reading
Request your trial