Romantic Liberalism: An Alternative Perspective on Liberal Disrespect in the Muhammad Cartoons Controversy
| Published date | 01 March 2014 |
| Date | 01 March 2014 |
| Author | Gina Gustavsson |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.12022 |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
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P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 1 4 VO L 6 2 , 5 3 – 6 9
doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12022
Romantic Liberalism: An Alternative Perspective
on Liberal Disrespect in the Muhammad
Cartoons Controversy
Gina Gustavsson
Uppsala University
There is an increasing scholarly concern that liberalism comes into conflict with religious diversity. William Galston
blames this tendency on ‘Enlightenment liberalism’, which places autonomous self-reflection at the heart of the liberal
project. This article, however, proposes a culprit that is more prone to both disrespect and dogmatism: romantic
liberalism, which idealises authentic self-expression. I develop this concept by revisiting the Danish cartoon contro-
versy, allegedly a case of Enlightenment liberalism. This exercise reveals that Flemming Rose, the editor who
commissioned the cartoons, invokes romantic rather than enlightened values in defence of the publication. In contrast
to previous research, I show that Rose does not portray the disrespectfulness of the cartoons as a side-effect of trying
to promote autonomy among Muslims. Rather, he argues in favour of artistic provocation as such, invoking a distinctly
romantic understanding of freedom of speech, which in many ways runs counter to the ideal of autonomy.
Keywords: autonomy; diversity; Enlightenment liberalism; freedom of speech; authenticity
Scholars are increasingly concerned that the liberal tradition itself invites a certain moral
arrogance towards religious minorities, and thus fails to respect the need for diversity. The
culprit, it is widely agreed, is a liberalism centred on the ideal of autonomy (see Galston,
2002; Joppke, 2007; King, 1999; Kukathas, 2007; Lomasky, 1987).
The present article, by contrast, proposes another culprit. In what follows, I revisit the
defence of the Danish Muhammad cartoons, which have been interpreted as a case of liberal
disrespect for the sake of promoting autonomy among Muslims (Rostbøll, 2009). My
analysis, however, suggests that this is rather a case of ‘romantic liberalism’: a tradition that
places authentic self-expression, not autonomy, at the heart of the liberal project. In the
following, I develop the concept of romantic liberalism – which does not only allow for but
encourages disrespect and provocation.
The specific point of departure for this article is William Galston’s notion of ‘Enlight-
enment liberalism’. According to Galston, much discussion over ‘such currently disputed
areas as education, rights of association, and the free exercise of religion’ can be understood
as a clash between two opposing strands of liberalism: Reformation liberalism and Enlight-
enment liberalism. Reformation liberalism conceives of liberal institutions as a way to
advance diversity, of promoting ‘legitimate differences among individuals and groups over
such matters as the nature of the good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith,
and the like’. Enlightenment liberalism, by contrast, sees the ultimate goal of the liberal
project as fostering autonomy, a certain conception of the good life. According to Galston,
Enlightenment liberals, as opposed to Reformation liberals, thus tend to interfere with
choices that are seen not as the result of rational self-reflection, but rather of unswerving
faith or tradition (Galston, 2002, pp. 24–6).
© 2013 The Author. Political Studies © 2013 Political Studies Association
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G I N A G U S T A V S S O N
I should note here that I do not take issue with the normative conclusion that this kind
of intervention in the name of liberalism is indeed a problem. In the following, I will instead
challenge the description that Galston and others have put forward regarding the roots of the
problem. My point is that their one-sided focus on Enlightenment liberalism neglects
recent sociological research, which suggests that popular attitudes in Western democracies
reveal an increased commitment to ‘authentic self-expression’, ‘maximum personal devel-
opment and self-realization’, often at the cost of typical Enlightenment values, such as
critical reasoning and a search for common moral rules (Flanagan and Lee, 2003, p. 238;
Johnston Conover et al., 2001, pp. 56–8). There appears to be an increasing tendency
towards what Robert Bellah and his associates refer to as ‘expressive individualism’, namely
seeking spiritual well-being by living life from within, in line with intuition and intense
feeling, rather than reason and reflection (Bellah et al., 2008, pp. 127–8, pp. 333–4). These
value trends imply that, if we are really to capture contemporary examples of disrespect in
the name of liberalism, we ought to move beyond Enlightenment liberalism.
The present article takes a first step in this direction by reconstructing a rival liberal
tradition, romantic liberalism, which is currently lacking from these discussions. In contrast
to Nancy Rosenblum (1987), who certainly offers an insightful discussion of the overlap
between liberal and romantic thought in her construction of ‘another liberalism’, my
account of a specifically romantic liberalism allows us to see its collision with Enlighten-
ment liberalism. Moreover, while Rosenblum’s discussion revolves around the history of
liberal thought, this article will investigate a romantic understanding of liberalism in a
specific contemporary case: the Danish cartoon controversy, which has previously been
interpreted as an example of Enlightenment liberalism (Rostbøll, 2009).
More precisely, I will look at the arguments invoked by one of its key actors, if not the
protagonist: Flemming Rose, editor at Jyllands-Posten at the time of the publication.
Previous accounts of the cartoon crisis have paid remarkably little attention to Rose’s
defence.1 Yet it was Rose’s decision to commission and publish the famous cartoons in the
first place, and he has continued to play the role of main defender of the cartoons in the
ensuing debate. He is also alone among the cartoon defenders in having developed a
defence of this position at considerable length (Rose, 2010).
The present article does not only contribute, then, to theoretical discussions of disre-
spectful tendencies within liberalism. It also provides a first thorough analysis of Rose’s
arguments, and thus a valuable addition to our understanding of the Danish cartoon
controversy. While it might seem that developing the concept of romantic liberalism and
establishing Rose’s position are two very different purposes, I will show that these tasks are
in fact well integrated, and that the two discussions enrich each other.The ultimate purpose
of conceptualising romantic liberalism – or, as Galston does, Reformation and Enlighten-
ment liberalism – is to make better sense of precisely the kind of empirical political
discourses of today that the cartoon controversy exemplifies.
I note here that to say that a certain position is liberal is not, in this article, to justify it,
but merely to state a historical and political connection. Liberalism here denotes any
position that defends universal political liberties – such as freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, the right to vote and the right to a private sphere – even when, as in the case of
romantic liberalism, these liberties are conceived of as the means for promoting a certain
© 2013 The Author. Political Studies © 2013 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2014, 62(1)
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comprehensive ideal. Romantic liberalism is of course not a political liberalism in the sense
that John Rawls (1993) famously uses the term, and neither is Enlightenment liberalism.
The article is structured as follows. The next section recapitulates and challenges the
prevailing understanding of the cartoon controversy as a case of Enlightenment liberalism.
In the subsequent section, I offer a closer analysis of how Rose defended the cartoons.This
reveals that for him, disrespect of religion is not a side-effect of promoting the Enlighten-
ment’s ideal of autonomy; rather, his very argument for the cartoons relies on a romantic
notion of the good life that welcomes provocation as such. In the following section, I
propose that we call Rose’s position a case of romantic liberalism, and I suggest that we
should expect this position to be more prone than Enlightenment liberalism to disrespect
and even dogmatism. The final section summarises my findings and their implications for
future research.
The Cartoons and Enlightenment Liberalism
In September 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons depict-
ing the Muslim prophet Muhammad. The cartoons famously provoked much violent and
non-violent protest, and a vigorous debate regarding the limits of free expression.2
However, the debate did not only concern whether or not Jyllands-Posten had the right
to publish the cartoons. Flemming Rose, and many who defended his decision to com-
mission the cartoons, claimed that publishing them was not only within the limits of free
speech, but also represented a laudable use of this right. In their view, a good liberal should
encourage mockery and ridicule of religion; in particular, it seemed, of Islam (Hansen,
2006a; 2006b; O’Leary, 2006; Rose, 2010). It is with this position that my article is
concerned, for it is here that scholars have suggested we find a form of liberal fundamen-
talism rooted in the project of the Enlightenment.3
A common conclusion in analyses...
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