RR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions: Empowering Tribunals to Enforce the Human Rights Act 1998
Published date | 01 May 2020 |
Author | Joe Tomlinson,Alexandra Sinclair |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12528 |
Date | 01 May 2020 |
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Modern Law Review
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2230.12528
RR vSecretary of State for Work and Pensions:
Empowering Tribunals to Enforce the Human Rights
Act 1998
Joe Tomlinson∗and Alexandra Sinclair†
In RR vSecretary of State for Work and Pensions – follow-on litigation from the high-profile
bedroom tax cases – the Supreme Court handed down a judgment which has significant
implications for social security law, the interpretation of the Human Rights Act, the tribunals
system, the judicial control of delegated legislation, and access to justice. Central, however, was
the issue of the enforceability of human rights. We argue that the Supreme Court was not only
justified in its interpretation of the Human Rights Act but that it has made the protections of
the Act more easily enforceable.
INTRODUCTION
The Human Rights Act 1998 is a controversial piece of legislation. Whether
it is properly considered to be a ‘constitutional statute’ worthy of greater legal
status or a candidate for repeal, it is law and has been for two decades now.1
This being so, it is important, as with all laws, that it is realistically enforceable
by individuals.2Given the general and arguably fundamental nature of its
protections, it might be thought to be especially important to ensure that
the rights it protects are easily enforceable. In this case note, we analyse the
recent Supreme Court judgment in RR vSecretary of State for Work and Pensions
(RR) – follow-on litigation from the high-profile bedroom tax cases.3As we
demonstrate, this judgment has significant implications for social security law,
the interpretation of the Human Rights Act, the tribunals system, the judicial
control of delegated legislation, and access to justice. At its core, however, is
the issue of the enforceability of human rights laws.
∗Senior Lecturer in Public Law, University of York; Research Director, Public Law Project. Both
authors assisted Liberty, the Child Poverty Action Group, and the Public Law Project with research
for an intervention in the RR Supreme Court hearing. We areg rateful for their,and the legal team’s,
input in developing the analysis presented in this note. We also thank Jed Meers, Roger Masterman
and Nick O’Brien for comments on a draft version of this note.
†Fellow, Public Law Project.
2019).
2R (UNISON) vLord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51; [2017] 3 WLR 409 at [71] per Lord Reed; T.
Bingham, TheRuleofLaw(London: Penguin, 2010).
3RR vSecretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] UKSC 52. Our focus in this article is on the
point vis-`
a-vis tribunals.
C2020The Authors. The Moder n Law Review C2020 The Modern Law Review Limited. (2020) 83(3) MLR 652–660
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