Rundle against Little and another

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date01 January 1844
Date01 January 1844
CourtCourt of the Queen's Bench

English Reports Citation: 115 E.R. 68

QUEEN'S BENCH

Rundle against Little and another

S. C. 13 L. J. Q. B. 311; 8 Jur. 668.

[S. C. 13 L. J. Q. B. 311; 8 Jur. 668.] Trespass for breaking and entering plaintiff's dwelling house, and seizing, and taking and converting, his goods and chattels. Count for the seizing, taking and converting only, alleging special damage. Plea : not guilty. On the trial, before Coleridge J., ab the Exeter Summer Assizes, 1843, it appeared that the alleged trespass was the seizing and publicly selling the plaintiff's goods to satisfy a debt alleged to have been due from him to one John Eastcott. The defendants were attorneys in partnership, employed on the occasion by Eastcott; and the proof connecting them with the trespass was, that they had handed the writ of fi. fa. to the sheriff. The defence was, that they had done nothing more than was required by their duty as attorneys, and, therefore, were not liable: and Oodrington v. Lloyd (8 A. & E. 449), was cited. To support this defence, they offered in evidence the judgment on which the writ had been issued. The evidence was objected to, but admitted by the learned Judge, though with doubt. It was stated on cross examination tliat proceedings had been taken to set the judgment aside for irregularity; but there was no proof that it had been set aside. It was also proved for the defendants that the money levied had been paid back to the now plaintiff, but after action brought. This evidence was likewise objected to. Coleridge J. [175] stated to the jury as his opinion that if an attorney in a case of this kind has only acted according to his duty as an officer of the Court, as by merely issuing a writ, he is not liable to an action; that the present defendants appeared to have acted only in the ordinary course of business; and that the charge of malice could not be raised in this form of action : he, therefore, left it to the jury, in the first place, to say whether or not the defendants were guilty; and, secondy, if the verdict was guilty, to fix the amount of damages; stating as his opinion that they could scarcely be too small; and observing that the levy had been made under a judgment, writ and warrant, and that the money had been repaid after action brought. The jury found for the plaintiff, damages one farthing. Crowder, in Michaelmas term, 1843, obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of improper reception of evidence. In last Easter term (a) Cockburn and M...

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1 cases
  • Cb-22Ncvc-28-12-2019 Tnb v Rajakumaran Ors
    • Malaysia
    • Session Court (Malaysia)
    • 17 February 2023
    ...in the case of loss by damage or destruction. Only the former falls for consideration here.” [47] Malahan di dalam kes Rundle v Little [1844] 6 QB 174 dinyatakan seperti “In the case a rule nisi was obtained for a new trial in consequence of the admission of improper evidence; viz., in an a......

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