Running To Stand Still
| Author | Ralph Sandland |
| DOI | 10.1177/0964663909103630 |
| Date | 01 June 2009 |
| Published date | 01 June 2009 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
RUNNING TO STAND STILL
RALPH SANDLAND
University of Nottingham, UK
LAW IS a complex thing. It functions, and can be analysed, at a variety
of ‘levels’. For example, law is, among other things, both a pragmatic
intervention and a philosophical-political narrative. The lead article in
this Dialogue and Debate section is able to present the Gender Recognition
Act 2004 (GRA) as a ‘great leap forward’ only by focusing on the first, and
ignoring the second, of these levels. Of course, it cannot be disputed, for the
reasons Sharpe outlines, that the Act significantly extends the life choices
open to many trans persons. It came fully into force on 4 April 2005,1and
by September 2007 over 2200 people had applied for recognition, of whom
97.5 per cent had been successful in their application.2Such seismic develop-
ments in the substantive legal rights of trans persons are indeed welcome.
However, there is room for some disquiet: at the second level, of its theor-
etical underpinning, there is (intentionally) little that is new about the GRA.
The Act was presented by the Government as its own work3and yet, of
course, its introduction was prompted precisely by the decisions of the
European Court in Goodwin v UK (2002) and Iv UK (2002). In those cases
the UK Government – the same Government that was later to claim credit
for the Act – advanced exclusionary arguments, for example, that transsexual
people were not denied the right to marry under UK law at that time, as it
was open to any person, trans or not, to marry a person of the opposite birth
sex, and hence there was no breach of Article 12. This argument was rightly
dismissed by the European Court as ‘artificial’ (Goodwin vUK, 2002: para.
101). Sharpe also notes that the 2004 Act was the product of consultation
with the trans community. Indeed it was, but that process, which was only
commenced in response to comments made by the European Court in the
earlier case of Sheffield and Horsham v UK (1998), had been allowed to slide
quietly into abeyance before the European Court finally insisted that the UK
Government take action. The marked reluctance of the Labour administration
to grapple seriously with this question for several years raises the question
of whether its latterly found enthusiasm for the rights of trans persons is
altogether genuine.
More importantly, although the GRA was presented by the Government
as an integral part of its social inclusion programme,4in truth, it is better seen
SOCIAL &LEGAL STUDIES © The Author(s), 2009
Reprints and Permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
0964 6639, Vol. 18(2), 253–257
DOI: 10.1177/0964663909103630
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