Russia and China Respond to Soft Power: Interpretation and Readaptation of a Western Construct
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9256.12095 |
| Author | Jeanne L. Wilson |
| Published date | 01 November 2015 |
| Date | 01 November 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
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P O L I T I C S : 2 0 1 5 V O L 3 5 ( 3 - 4 ) , 2 8 7 – 3 0 0
doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12095
Russia and China Respond to Soft Power:
Interpretation and Readaptation of a
Western Construct
Jeanne L. Wilson
Wheaton College
This article examines the Russian and Chinese perspective of soft power. It argues that Russia and China are not
simply authoritarian states; rather they are authoritarian states of a specialised sub-category that share a joint
legacy of adherence to a Communist experience which significantly informs their behaviour and sense of
national identity. As a consequence, both the Kremlin and Beijing consider that the soft power methods of the
West present nothing less than an existential threat, and conceive of a soft power policy as the outcome of state
initiatives rather than the product of an autonomous civil society.
Keywords: Russia; China; soft power; image; communist legacy
Introduction
In the last decade, both the Russian and Chinese leaderships have endorsed soft power as a
regime goal. The term ‘soft power’ – if not its conceptual underpinnings – is almost universally
associated with the persona of Joseph Nye, a Harvard University professor and occasional US
government official. Nye, moreover, has been explicit that his understanding of soft power has
both a theoretical and prescriptive component. His motivation is to maintain US hegemony in
the global arena through measures that enhance the attractiveness of the United States. Nye
has also made it clear that his vision of soft power rests on adherence to distinctly Western
norms and values. As Richard Ned Lebow (2005, p. 522) has noted: ‘Nye takes it for granted
that the American way of life is so attractive, even mesmerizing and the global public goods
it supposedly provides so beneficial, that others are predisposed to follow Washington’s lead.’
This raises the question as to how Russia and China as authoritarian regimes and a status as
outliers in the international system interpret soft power. A key concern, or puzzle, of this
investigation is to examine and explain the Russian and Chinese response to soft power in the
context of their evolving efforts to construct a national identity that maintains the current
regime and contests Western dominance in the prevailing international order. To these ends
I argue, following the analysis laid out by Gilbert Rozman (2014), that Russia and China are
not simply authoritarian states; rather they are authoritarian states of a specialised sub-
category that share a joint legacy of adherence to a communist experience that significantly
informs their behaviour. This provides a distinctive convergence in their assessment of soft
power, indicated (1) by their consensual perception that the soft power methods of the West
present nothing less than an existential threat; and (2) an understanding of soft power as the
outcome of state initiatives rather than the product of an autonomous civil society.
© 2015 The Author. Politics © 2015 Political Studies Association
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J E A N N E L . W I L S O N
The Russian and Chinese framing of the West – and in particular the US – as an existential
threat is susceptible to interpretation through several alternative theoretical approaches, each
of which possesses a certain explanatory power. A large literature, both scholarly and popular,
relies on realist assumptions in analysing Russian and Chinese foreign policy behaviour and
motivations. Both the Kremlin and Beijing exhibit a conventional concern with the material
capabilities of power, and a neo-realist awareness of the structural configuration of power
relationships in the international system, which places them in a disadvantageous position
relative to the US. Both regimes are highly sensitive to geopolitical assessments, seen in
Russia’s concern to preserve a zone of influence in the post-Soviet space and China’s deter-
mination to exert sovereignty over disputed islands and develop a blue water navy capable of
protecting shipping lanes and asserting Chinese predominance in a potential military encoun-
ter with Taiwan. Realist assumptions, however, are not adequate in explaining crucial aspects
of Russian and Chinese conduct. The Kremlin, for example, has long acknowledged that
neither Missile Defence nor NATO enlargement poses a military threat to Russia. Rather, as
former Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov, noted, the expansion of NATO was not a military
problem, but a psychological one (Tsygankov, 2013b, p. 186).1 As a number of constructivist
oriented scholars have observed, the Kremlin’s determination of its interests do not reflect
material considerations of power as much as perceptions of its national identity – a situation
that is especially evident in Russian concerns to be seen as a great power (see Clunan 2009;
Hopf 2002). In a similar vein, the issue of Taiwan aside, the Chinese leadership does not
convey much anxiety about the US as a military threat, and has rejected efforts to reach
military parity with the US in favour of a defensive policy of a minimum reliable deterrence
(Wu, 2013).
In recent years, both the Kremlin and Beijing have paid increasing attention to civilisational
themes as a component of identity discourse. Western scholarship has stressed Russia’s
centuries-long preoccupation with delineating its identity relative to Europe. The actual
vocabulary employed – ‘Slavophiles’, ‘Westernisers’, ‘Statists’, ‘Civilisationalists’, etc. – varies,
but it articulates a value system that is formed in relationship to Europe as a determinant
other (see Neumann, 1996a; 1996b; Tsygankov, 2005; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010). In
contrast, the traditional Chinese sense of identity lacks a historical referent to the West. Rather
Chinese civilisational discourse has historically drawn a distinction between a morally
superior China and a barbarian other. The Chinese sense of exceptionalism was an outgrowth
of the unquestioned assumption that China was the sole cultural centre of the world (see Bell,
2009; Callahan, 2011). In both cases, however, Russian and Chinese political elites have
displayed an increasing tendency toward Russocentrism and Sinocentrism as a means of
resisting the assimilationist pressures exerted by the West.
Andrei Tsygankov (2014) has noted the tendency of political elites to make use of
civilisational values as a means of withstanding either an internal or an external threat. He has
also suggested the importance of nationalism as a motivating factor in Russian and Chinese
perceptions of the West as an existential challenge.2 This raises the question of the continued
relevance of Marxism-Leninism and the communist legacy as a component of Russian and
Chinese identity. There is no doubt that its importance has diminished. The demise of the
Soviet Union dealt a formal death blow to Marxism-Leninism as an ideological framework for
the emergent Russian Federation, while in China the embrace of key components of the
market mechanism meant the increasing calcification of Marxist-Leninism as a meaningful
component of daily life. Yet over twenty years later, Russia and China have moved closer to
each other on identity issues than at any time since the heyday of the Sino-Soviet friendship
© 2015 The Author. Politics © 2015 Political Studies Association
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period of the 1950s (see Rozman, 2014). In this sense, the Kremlin and Beijing encounter the
communist era as their most proximate historical memory, which continues to exert an
influence on domestic and foreign policy decisions. Three interrelated elements of this legacy
are especially significant. First, both leaderships continue to perceive of relations within the
international system through the lens of attitudes inherited from the Cold War, leading to a
situation that Richard Sakwa (2013) has referred to as a ‘mimetic Cold War’. Second, in
replication of Cold War interactions, the Kremlin and Beijing continue to perceive of the US
as the hegemonic other that poses the most direct threat to their survival. Third, Russia and
China revert to an essentially Leninist vocabulary in depicting Western behaviour as impelled
by an imperialist agenda. This is a struggle, however, that has been transferred to the
ideological sphere, with the West, led by the US, seen to be making use of subversive and
illegitimate methods of soft power.
Soft power as a theoretical construct
The academic literature on soft power largely assesses the concept in response to Nye’s
understanding of the term, rather than seeking to pose a theoretical alternative. Nye first
introduced soft power in 1990 and has continued to refine his work in the area up until the
present (see, e.g. Nye, 1990, 2004, 2008, 2011b, 2013). In his 2004 work Soft Power, he
famously described ‘soft power’ as a means of seduction that rested on the ability to shape the
preferences of others through co-optation rather than threats or force. Nye focuses on culture,
political values and foreign policy, as fundamental sources of soft power, while emphasising
that it is to a considerable – and indeed decisive – extent generated by resources that are
beyond the ability of the state to control, residing in the individual initiatives of the private
sector, citizens and groups in civil society.
Nye’s treatment of soft power has been the subject of considerable scholarly interest.
Although he stresses that ‘there is no...
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