Russia and the Balkans: Pan-Slavism, Partnership and Power
| Author | Lenard J. Cohen |
| Published date | 01 December 1994 |
| Date | 01 December 1994 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070209404900405 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
LENARD
J.
COHEN
Russia
and
the
Balkans:
pan-Slavism,
partnership
and
power
In
Moscow
today
essentially
the
same
forces
are
con-
solidating
themselves
as
are
doing
so
in
Belgrade
...
they
are
replacing
the
communist
mythology
with
pseudo-patriotic
mythology
...
Simplemindedness
is
worse
than
thievery.
This
is
especially
true
in very
com-
plicated
conflicts
between
nationalities.
Andrei
Kozyrev,
June
1992
Looking
back
into history
there
used
to
be
a
Great
Serbia
and there
was
order
and
silence
...
We
choose
the
lesser
of
two
evils.
The
lesser
evil
is
Serbia's
rule
in
the
Balkans,
the
greater
evil
is
small
states
swallowing
and
killing each
other
every
day.
Vladimir
Zhirinovsky,
February
1994
Deep
political
divisions
within
the
Russian
Federation
during
the
early
199os
have
had
a
significant
influence on
the
evolu-
tion
of
both
official
and
non-official
Russian
political
attitudes
towards
the
complicated
crisis
in
the
Balkan
region.
Thus
for
many
Russians
who
witnessed
the
break-up
of
the
multi-ethnic
Yugoslav
socialist
federation
and
the
subsequent
violence
which
erupted
within
and
among
Yugoslavia's
successor
states,
the
Bal-
kans
became
a
dark
mirror
reflecting
the
images
and dangers
which
might
befall
the
Russian
Federation
and
the
other
former
Professor
of
Political
Science, Simon
Fraser
University,
Burnaby,
British
Columbia;
author
of
Broken
Bonds:
The
Disintegration
of
Yugoslavia
(1993).
InternationalJournalXLIX
AUTUMN
1994
THE
BALKANS
815
republics
of
the
USSR.
Other
Russians, especially
those
troubled
by
the waning
of
Moscow's
global
influence
in
the
wake
of
the
disintegration
of
the
USSR,
viewed
the
political
fragmentation
and conflagration
in
the
Balkans
as
an
opportunity
for
Russia
to
reassert
its
traditional influence
in
southeastern Europe
and
to
re-establish
Moscow's
status
and
prestige
on
the
world
stage.
This article explores
three
aspects
of
the
evolution
of
official
and
non-official
Russian
views
of
the
Balkans:
(1)
the
legacy
of
Soviet
policy towards
the
'Yugoslav
crisis'
which
emerged
during
the
twilight
of
the
USSR;
(2)
the
polarization
of
political
atti-
tudes
within
Russia
during
the
early
and
politically
turbulent
phase
of
the
Yeltsin
regime
(1992-3);
and
(3)
the
motivation
and
consequences
of
recent
Russian
initiatives
seeking
the
res-
olution
of
the
war
in
Bosnia-Hercegovina,
including
the
impact
of
those
measures
on
the
Russian
Federation's
broader
relation-
ship
with
the
international
community.
PERESTROIKA
AND
SOVIET
POLICY
TOWARDS
YUGOSLAVIA'S
DISINTEGRATION
Wrestling
with
the
fallout
from the
prelude
to
and
the
violent
aftermath
of
Yugoslavia's
dissolution
was
one
of
Mikhail
Gor-
bachev's
main foreign
policy
challenges
during
the
last
five
years
of
the
Soviet
regime.
Indeed,
the
flare-up
of
inter-ethnic
con-
flicts
in post-Tito
Yugoslavia
and
the
consequent
threat
to
that
country's
survival
coincided
with
an
outbreak
of
serious
nation-
alist
tension
within
the
USSR.
To
a
large
extent,
that
tension
was
precipitated
by
Gorbachev's
bold
but
ultimately
ill-fated
efforts
to
reform
state
socialism.
Hoping
that
his
reform
programme
would
preserve
the
unity
and
socialist
character
of
the
multi-
national
Soviet
state,
Gorbachev
naturally
was
a
vigorous
advo-
cate
of
preserving
the
cohesion
and
territorial
integrity
of
the
Yugoslav
federation.
Renowned
for
its
own
brand of
reformist
experimentation,
socialist
Yugoslavia's
reform
efforts
had
pre-
saged
many
of
the
initiatives
that
Gorbachev
was
attempting
to
introduce
within
the
USSR.
His
support
for the
preservation
of
816
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
the
Yugoslav
federation
also
dovetailed
with
the
policies
of
other
global actors, such
as
the
United
States
and
the
European
Com-
munity
(EC),
new
'friends'
whom
the
Soviet
leader
badly
needed
if
he
was
to
implement
his
own
reform programme.
Near
the
end
of
the
198os,
the
Kremlin
attempted
to
remain
neutral
as
the
nationalist
conflicts
accelerated
in
Yugoslavia
both
within
and
outside
the
League
of
Communists. Gorbachev
urged
all
parties
in
the
Balkans
to
resolve
their
differences
peacefully
and
to
work
for
the
retention
and
improvement
of
a
federal
framework.
The
importance
that
Gorbachev
gave
to
Yugoslav
cohesion
and
his
appreciation
of
the
dangers
which
nationalist
conflict
posed
to
reformist
socialism
were
very
apparent
during
his
May
1988
trip
to Yugoslavia.
Although
most
of
the
trip
-
the
first
to
the
country
by
a
top
Soviet
leader
since
198o
-
focussed
on
reaffirming
Soviet-Yugoslav
economic
and
political
ties
and
on
showcasing
Moscow's positive
evaluation
of
reformist experi-
mentation
in
eastern
Europe,
it
was
also
clear
that
Gorbachev
was
keenly
aware
that
the
success
or
failure
of
managing
inter-
ethnic
conflict
in
Yugoslavia
might
have
important
conse-
quences
for
the
USSR.
Visiting
Yugoslavia
only
shortly
after
ethnic
violence
had
erupted
in
the
Soviet
Caucasus,
Gorbachev
characterized
such
nationalist
unrest
in
the
USSR
as
the
normal
venting
of
long pent-up
grievances
and
a
necessary
accompa-
niment
to
the
introduction of
reform.
'Tell
me
where
there
are
no
problems, name
me
such
a
country,'
Gorbachev
demanded
of
reporters.
'I
want
to
fly
there
immediately
after
Yugoslaviia,
without
calling
in
at
Moscow.'
Gorbachev
admitted,
however,
that
in
the
past
the
Soviet
Union
had
ignored
ethnic
difficulties
and conceded
that
as
a
result
such
'problems
have
accumu-
lated."
During
the trip
Gorbachev's
advisers also
pointed
to
Yugoslavia
as
an
example
of
the
regional
inequalities
which
can
arise
when
a
socialist
regime
undertakes
excessive
decentrali-
i
Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Service/Soviet Union
(hereafter
FBIS/SOV),
88-051,
j6
March
1988,
23.
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