Sanctions through the Looking Glass
| Date | 01 June 2000 |
| Published date | 01 June 2000 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200005500203 |
| Author | Margaret P. Doxey |
| Subject Matter | Article |
MARGARET
P.
DOXEY
Sanctions
through
the
looking
glass
The
spectrum ofgoals
and
achievements
ONE
OF
THE
MANY
UNEXPECTED
RESULTS
of
the
end
of
the
cold
war
has
been
the
frequent
use
of
sanctions
by
the
United
Nations
Security
Council
to
deal
with
crises
arising
between
and within
member
states.
In
the
past decade,
three
major
cases
have
involved
comprehensive,
mandatory
economic
sanctions
imposed
under chapter
Vii
of
the
United
Nations
charter:
Iraq
(where sanctions
are still
in
force),
Haiti
(1993-4),
and
Yugoslavia
(where
some
sanctions
were
reimposed
in
1998).
In
response to
allegations
of
support
for
international
terror-
ism,
selective
sanctions
were
imposed
on
Libya
(suspended
in
1999)
and
Sudan
(still
in
force)
and most
recently
on
the
Taliban faction
in
Afghanistan.
Civil
conflict
in
Africa
produced
mandatory
arms
embar-
goes
on
Somalia,
Liberia,
Angola
(the
UNITA
movement),
Rwanda,
and
Sierra
Leone.
Travel
restrictions
and
selective
trade
sanctions
have
also
been
applied
to
UNITA.
A
complete
list
of
chapter
VII
sanctions to
January
2000
appears
as
Annex
1.
Before
1990
sanctions
were
used
extensively
by
individual
states and
by
international
organizations
such
as
the
Arab
League,
the
Organization
of
American
States
(OAS),
the
Organization
of
African
Unity
(OAU),
and the
Commonwealth.'
South
Africa
in
particular
pro-
Professor
Emeritus
and
Senior
Research
Associate,
Department
of
Political
Studies,
Trent
Unitersit,
Peterborough.
Author
ofInternational
Sanctions in
Contemporary
Perspective
(1996).
1
For
case
studies
see
Gary
Clyde
Hufbauer,
Jeffrey
j.
Schott,
and
Kimberly
Ann
Elliott,
Economic
Sanctions
Reconsidered
(2nd
ed:
Washington
DC:
Institute
for
International
Economics
199o);
Margaret
P.
Doxey,
International
Sanctions
in
Contemporary Perspective
(2nd
ed:
NY:
St
Martins
1996).
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
2000
Margaret
P.
Doxey
voked
intense
discussion
and
analysis, from
both
proponents
and
opponents
of
the
value
of
economic
pressure
to
bring
an
end
to
apartheid, and
an
impressive
range
of
penalties
was
imposed
by
official
and
unofficial
bodies.2
But
between
1945
and
1990
the
Security
Council
issued
only
two
sanctions
orders:
comprehensive
sanctions
on
Rhodesia
from
1966
to
1979
and
a
mandatory
arms
embargo
on
South
Africa
from
1977
to
1994.
Not
surprisingly,
the spate
of
recent
cases
has
prompted
policy-makers
and
scholars
to
scrutinize
closely
all
aspects
of
the
process
of
multilateral
sanctioning.'
Ends
and
means,
causes
and
effects,
have
been
exhaustively analysed
and
queried,
and
the
prolongation
of
harsh
sanctions
regimes,
particularly against
Iraq,
has
brought
a
heightened
awareness
of
the
defects
of
negative
econom-
ic
measures.
If
sanctions
are
seen
as
'medicine'
that
rarely
'works,'
the
contra-indications
have
acquired
a
high
profile.
Perennial
doubts
about
efficacy
are
now
complemented,
even
overshadowed,
by
concern
for
adverse
effects
on
the
civilian
population
in
target
countries.
4
Problems
of
costs
for
sender
states,
particularly
those
bordering
on
the
target,
have
come
to
the
fore
and,
in
a
wider
context,
there
are
dangers
of
adding
to
global
economic
difficulties
and
retarding development
by
interfering
with
normal
patterns
of
economic
relations.
President
Woodrow
Wilson's
description
of
economic boycott
as
a
'peaceful,
silent,
deadly
remedy'
has
acquired
nuances
of
meaning
that
would
surprise
him.
Given
these negative
factors,
doubts
about
whether sanctions
'work'
acquire
added
significance.
In
some
circumstances
it
appears
they
may
even
strengthen
target
regimes.
On
the
other
hand,
they
offer
a
preferable
alternative
to
the
use
of
military
force
and
their
fre-
quent
use
suggests
that
governments
find
them
indispensable
as
instruments
of
foreign
policy.
Prompted
by
recent
writing on
the
sub-
2
Doxey,
ibid,
23-6.
3
See,
for
instance,
David
Cortright
&
George
A.
Lopez,
eds, Economic
Sanctions:
Panacea
or
Peacebuilding
in
a
Post-Cold
War
World
(Boulder
Co:
Westview
1995);
John
Stremlau,
Sharpening
International
Sanctions:
Towards
a
Stronger
Role
for
the
United
Nations.
Report
to
the
Carnegie Commission
on
Preventing
Deadly Conflict
(NY:
Carnegie
1996);
Thomas
G.
Weiss
etal,
eds,
Political
Gain
and Civilian
Pain
(Lanham
MD:
Rowman &
Littlefield
1997);
Margaret
R
Doxey,
United
Nations
Sanctions:
Lessons
of
Experience
(rev
ed: Halifax
NS:
Dalhousie
University
Centre
for
Foreign
Policy
Studies
1999).
4
See
Weiss
et
at,
Political
Gain.
208
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL Spring2000
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