Securing Uncertainty
| Date | 01 September 2011 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117811416289 |
| Published date | 01 September 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Relations
25(3) 363 –380
© The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117811416289
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Securing Uncertainty:
Sub-state Security Dilemma
and the Risk of Intervention
Florian P. Kühn
Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg
Abstract
The theoretical concept John Herz called a ‘security dilemma’ has rarely been applied to sub-
state social figurations, although security dilemmas do shape political behaviour in post-conflict
peacebuilding. Comparable to state formation, sub-state groups develop institutional capacities.
Often led by ‘warlords’ or ‘strongmen’, these entities resemble states within, while lacking
recognition and legitimacy from without. Between these entities arises a sub-sovereign form
of security dilemma. It is a result of uncertainty about the other’s motives regarding expansion,
control of sources of funding, or domination within the legal order of the ‘state’. When
statebuilding is pursued by external actors, aiming to fill the legal void, the ‘state’ can become a
source of existential risks for sub-state entities. Risks – from extinction to the transformation
of a group’s socio-political identity – can stem from another sub-state group taking over the
state, appropriating superior means of coercion and hence enabling itself to subjugate others;
relative deprivation concerning external funding or revenue from trade or smuggling; or loss of
investment in networks of patronage, favourable terms of trade, or monopolies for certain goods.
External support adds considerable uncertainty about interventionists’ capabilities, willingness
and ability to steer and control statebuilding efforts. This article explores how risks and their
perception shape interaction between social actors and at the same time how awareness and
consideration of these risks may influence external actors’ behaviour. It argues that understanding
risk constellations within an intervention and their processual transformation is vital for external
statebuilding support.
Keywords
deflective risk management, external intervention, social figurations, state-building, sub-state
actors
Corresponding author:
Florian P Kühn, Institute for International Affairs, Helmut Schmidt University, Holstenhofweg 85, Hamburg
22043, Germany
Email: florian.p.kuehn@hsu-hh.de
Article
364 International Relations 25(3)
Introduction
John H. Herz’s notion of a ‘security dilemma’ and how it was understood for nearly half
a century relies on thinking about politics in modern categories. He took the state to be a
unit in a system; intra-state dynamics supposedly played a minor role. The state was seen
as a template, structuring societal interaction, thus negating the fact that the state was a
specific European development that only later spread across the world.1 The security
dilemma was thus primarily seen as a matter of inter-state relations. Herz did not, how-
ever, rule out the adaptation of his basic dilemma to other socio-political constellations.
Doing precisely that, I will outline the security dilemma as it works for sub-state groups
in a statebuilding environment, then turn to the risks they are facing, and, finally, recon-
nect these local constellations with the broader development of global politics under a
paradigm of risk.
Sub-state groups often assume tasks resembling those of states proper. In the first part,
I distinguish between the characteristics of states and non-state groups to show how the
structure of the international system helps or restrains the latter and shapes how these
sub-state arrangements interact with the state. The legal norm of statehood dictates that
even weak states claim supreme control, which feeds back to sub-state groups’ politics,
and often provides for a peculiar interplay between quasi-states (not recognised interna-
tionally), de facto non-states (with UN membership) and the ‘international community’.2
These interrelations, I argue, are characterised by questions of legitimacy.
The next part outlines the dimensions of sub-state groups’ competition with a state-to-
be-built: first, if groups are armed and uphold a spatially limited monopoly of force, they
risk losing political leverage by abandoning violence. Even if not in a security dilemma
situation with other groupings within the state, they will have considerably less influence
relinquishing the potential use of weapons3 and, second, lose a source of revenue. Quasi-
sovereignty on a given territory usually allows for extracting customs, violent buying
into economies or selling violence for protection rackets or as ‘security services’.4 Third,
symbolic capital decreases when groups lose the primacy to construe reality according to
their own norms. Thus, they are deprived of the sovereignty of interpretation of political
matters. Fourth, legitimacy is reproduced within sub-state security arrangements through
goods and services – however basic – but also by the ability to construct outside threats.
Inclusion into a broader state framework may significantly lower the legitimacy of sub-
state arrangements. Finally, time plays a critical role in the conception of risks and the
subsequent perception of insecurity. Expectations based on distinct groups’ view of other
actors significantly shape the security dilemma’s dynamics. They influence whether
there are in-built escalation or retarding factors which allow information to feed back, in
turn influencing perceptions or transforming prejudices: expectations may be self-
enforcing or open for reconsideration.
The final section looks at the framing of international risk politics. The construction
of a zone of closely cooperating Western liberal states that tend to view the ‘outside
world’ as a risk means politics is increasingly understood as risk management (see
Hameiri in this issue). This suggests that pro-active involvement in local conflicts, which
are now seen to spread terrorism and other contagious developments, has become the
leading idea of security policy.5 The emergence of global risk awareness may be traced
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