Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512107079639 |
| Published date | 01 September 2007 |
| Author | Andrej Tusicisny |
| Date | 01 September 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Tusicisny: Security Communities and Their Values 425
International Political Science Review (2007), Vol. 28, No. 4, 425–449
DOI: 10.1177/0192512107079639 © 2007 International Political Science Association
Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore)
Security Communities and Their Values:
Taking Masses Seriously
Andrej Tusicisny
Abstract. This article analyzes political and social values held by people
in security communities (regions in which large-scale use of violence
is very unlikely). Inhabitants of four security communities (in Europe,
North America, South America, and South-East Asia) are generally
more tolerant to out-groups than the rest of the world’s population.
In addition, comprehensive security communities (that is zones where
not only interstate war, but also civil war, has become unthinkable)
are characterized by higher interpersonal trust. The hypothesized
effect of democracy, economic liberalism, and social participation
was not confi rmed. Going back to Deutsch’s conceptualization of the
security community, the article challenges assumptions frequent in the
constructivist literature.
Keywords: • Security community • Liberal values • Public opinion
• Interpersonal trust • World values survey
Introduction
The promising concept of security communities, introduced by Deutsch et al.
(1957), successfully re-emerged in the mainstream of the international relations
literature after the end of the Cold War. A considerable effort has been made
in order to redefi ne the theoretical framework (for example, see Adler and
Barnett, 1998a) and the number of case studies has been expanding in recent
years.1 However, most analyses do nothing more than map how interstate war, as
a viable foreign policy alternative, did or did not disappear from the discourse
in a given region. Focusing on elites, they do not take the general public into
account. Quantitative studies are virtually absent in this area of research.
Attempting to overcome the limits of the usual approach, this article broadens
the defi nition of the security community beyond its present meaning of an area
without interstate war. Building upon Deutsch’s original concept, it also turns
attention to common values held by societies. First, I am interested in whether
426 International Political Science Review 28(4)
the development of security communities is also refl ected in people’s support for
political and social values. Second, the article identifi es the societal conditions
differentiating interstate security communities (zones without interstate war) from
areas where the use of large-scale violence became unthinkable not only between,
but also within, states. The main aim is to examine whether the values ascribed to
security communities by scholars are really supported by those communities.
Security Communities in Theory
Basic Concepts and Classifi cations
The concept of the security community was created by Deutsch et al. (1957: 3)
“as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men some day might
abolish war.” Their seminal work defi ned a security community as “a group of
people” integrated by a “sense of community,” that is, “a belief on the part of
individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point:
that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful
change’” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5). Peaceful change was in turn defi ned as “the
resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without
resort to large-scale physical force” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5).
Deutsch et al. (1957) also distinguished between two basic types of security
community. An amalgamated security community (such as the USA) emerges
when two or more previously independent political units form one larger unit
with one common government. A pluralistic security community (such as the
USA with Canada) consists of formally independent states.
Deutsch and his colleagues called for an extensive research program in order to
clarify the conditions of security community formation and how these conditions
“might be extended over larger and larger areas of the globe” (Deutsch et al.,
1957: 4). But the theory remained more or less dormant until its resurrection after
the end of the Cold War, when it was summoned by students of constructivism.
The research program was redefi ned, accordingly, and a new framework for study
was proposed.
Since regional integration has not led to a formal unifi cation of sovereign
states, as early postwar federalists often hoped, contemporary researchers deal
almost exclusively with pluralistic and not amalgamated security communities.
Pluralistic security communities have proved themselves to be astonishingly
vigorous. The European example in particular has inspired many (less success-
ful or ambitious) imitators throughout the globe. Moreover, as Deutsch et al.
(1957: 29) observed, “pluralistic security-communities turned out to be somewhat
easier to attain and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts.”
For these reasons, I focus on existing pluralistic security communities, although
some of the results might be applicable to amalgamated security communities
as well.
Adler and Barnett (1998b) described three phases of security community
development: security communities can be empirically identifi ed as nascent,
ascendant, and mature, and the mature ones can be categorized as either loosely
or tightly coupled. In a nascent security community, one observes “the min-
imal defi nitional properties and no more: a transnational region comprised of
sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful
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