Security Forces and Sexual Violence: A Cross-National Analysis of a Principal—Agent Argument
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343307082058 |
| Published date | 01 November 2007 |
| Author | Christopher K. Butler,Tali Gluch,Neil J. Mitchell |
| Date | 01 November 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
669
Introduction
This article examines the issue of delegation
in the implementation of violence. Earlier
research in the conflict and human rights
areas has tended to examine structural or
institutional factors. These factors include
ethnic fragmentation, economic develop-
ment, warfare, geographical terrain, or the
presence or absence of democracy. Those who
approach political violence as a choice focus
more on the strategic interactions, for
example the level of threat presented by
the opposition, and less on the motivation
of those who carry out the violence. The
purpose of this article is to show that violence,
and notably sexual violence, may be its own
reward for agents; that agents may misuse the
power and authority attached to their public
office to extract additional benefits; and that,
in order to understand the use of violence
and repression by the state, the interaction
© 2007 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 44, no. 6, 2007, pp. 669–687
Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore) http://jpr.sagepub.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343307082058
Security Forces and Sexual Violence: A Cross-
National Analysis of a Principal–Agent Argument*
CHRISTOPHER K. BUTLER, TALI GLUCH
Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico
NEIL J. MITCHELL
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen
This article investigates sexual violence committed by government security forces. It focuses on the issue
of delegation. It uses principal–agent logic to understand sexual violence committed by these forces and
to set up a cross-national empirical analysis. The article provides an approach to measuring the amount
of agent discretion in a political system and an analysis of new cross-national data on the incidence of
rape and sexual violence committed by police and security forces. It is argued that sexual violence is a
category of human rights violation that is more likely to be attributable to the selfish motivations of
agents, and it is an act that is likely to be hidden. This article identifies the conditions under which
these acts are most likely to occur as conditions of conflict, system-wide slack bureaucratic control, and
where there are constraints on information and organization. The theoretical argument makes sense of
earlier findings in the human rights literature, such as the importance of democracy and conflict, while
directing attention to motivations, accountability, and, for the first time in systematic analyses of human
rights, to the particular issue of sexual violence. The use of cross-national data on the incidence of sexual
violence for the year 2003 provides preliminary support for the theoretical argument. After controlling
for factors likely to increase the incidence of sexual violence, such as military size and ethnic fraction-
alization, it is found that, where agents are more accountable and subject to tighter control, sexual vio-
lence is less likely. Finally, the article points to the importance of additional data collection over time,
consistent with other human rights and conflict datasets, and draws out some policy implications follow-
ing from the theoretical argument and analysis.
*Thanks to the editor and the reviewers for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions. The data used in this article were ana-
lyzed using Stata 9.2 and can be found at http://www.prio.
no/jpr/datasets. Correspondence: n.mitchell@abdn.ac.uk.
between principal and agent is a critical
relationship.1The article argues that agents
seeking private goods influence the choice,
level, and type of violence, and that the way
principals and agents interact is central to our
understanding of political violence, including
the perpetration of sexual violence by govern-
ment or security forces.
While the leader is formally in charge,
principal–agent logic holds that the agents’
superior information and selfish natures
loosen control. This logic draws attention to
the potential for conflicting goals between
principals and agents, and, although the prin-
cipal is supposed to be in control, it draws
attention to the advantages that the agent
enjoys over the principal (Arrow, 1985).
Entrusting the task to others creates an oppor-
tunity for the agents’ own selfish and hidden
actions – it creates a moral hazard. The selfish
agent prefers shirking to working for example
(Brehm & Gates, 1997). Additionally, the prin-
cipal is likely to encounter adverse selection in
recruiting agents where individuals volunteer
for service with characteristics and tastes
potentially harmful to the principal’s mission,
comparable to an insurance company receiv-
ing applications from bad risks. In the rela-
tionship with the self-interested agent, the
principal is likely to be at an information dis-
advantage about the policy area and about the
extent of the agent’s selfish character and
actions. The size of the information disad-
vantage affects the ability of the principal to
control the agent. Economists and political
scientists have applied this logic and the
assumptions of superior information and
selfish actions on the part of agents to the
behavior of bureaucracies (Banks &
Weingast, 1992; Meier, 1993), including the
use of unnecessary force by police officers in
the United States (Brehm & Gates, 1997).
With a comparative research design, this
article aims to show that the issue of delega-
tion is equally important to our understand-
ing bureaucracies that supply violence and
the choice among types of repression imposed
by government forces. What should be clear
and what gives impetus for this article is that
not all security forces are alike, nor all con-
flicts, as Wood (2004, 2006) makes clear in
her pioneering comparative work on sexual
violence. They differ in the quality of recruits
selected, in the degree of discipline and
control exercised over agents, and in the
frequency of sexual violence.
If this logic applies as it does in other
policy areas, some of these agents will misuse
their operational knowledge, their uniform,
and government resources for their own
private benefit. Specifically, what are the
likely private goods of the agents? What evi-
dence is there that the independent selfish
activity of agents is contributing importantly
to levels of repression? How do we use this
logic to combat violence? This article pro-
vides evidence of the agents’ impact on the
level of violence by developing an approach
to collecting and analysing cross-national
data on the incidence of sexual violence com-
mitted by government forces. There is an
accumulation of research on the use of sexual
violence by government and security forces
and on the broader issue of women and the
military and women’s rights (Apodaca, 2000;
Arat, 2002; Beevor, 2002; Brownmiller, 1975;
Chang, 1997; Enloe, 1983, 2000; Goldstein,
2001; Henderson, 2004; Niarchos, 1995;
Walzer, 1977; Wood, 2004). There is an
empirical analysis of government responses
to sexual violence (see Weldon, 2002), but,
to our knowledge, there are no large-N cross-
national empirical analyses of sexual violence
committed by governments’ security forces.
Finally, the article points to policy implica-
tions and priorities consistent with this
theoretical approach.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 44 / number 6 / november 2007
670
1See, for example, Bawn (1995) and Huber & McCarty
(2004) for formal arguments, and Brehm & Gates (1997)
and Waterman, Rouse & Wright (2004) for empirical
analysis of the principal–agent relationship. See Mitchell
(2004) for this theoretical argument applied to human
rights violations in three historical cases.
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