Security in the Persian Gulf after Desert Storm
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209404900202 |
| Published date | 01 June 1994 |
| Date | 01 June 1994 |
| Author | Anwar-Ul-Haq Ahady |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ANWAR-UL-HAQ
AHADY
Security
in
the
Persian
Gulf
after
Desert
Storm
During
the Gulf
crisis
and
immediately
after
the defeat of
Iraq,
four
different
security
systems
for
the
Persian
Gulf
region
were
proposed:
an
Arab
system
based
on co-operation
between
Egypt,
Syria,
and
members
of
the Gulf
Cooperation
Council
(Gcc)
(Saudi
Arabia,
Kuwait,
Bahrain,
Qatar,
the
United
Arab
Emir-
ates,
and
Oman);
a
system
based
on
the Gulf littoral
states
and
led
by
Iran;
a
GcC-based
system;
and
a system
dominated
by
the
United
States.
The
last
of
these
alternatives
has
won
the
day.
This
paper
examines
these
four
potential
systems,
explains
why
the
American-dominated
system
has
prevailed
over
its
regional
rivals,
and
assesses
the strength of
this
new
security
system.
A
SYSTEM
BASED
ON
THE
DAMASCUS
DECLARATION
A
week
after
the
defeat
of
Iraq,
the
foreign ministers
of
the
GCC
countries,
Egypt,
and
Syria
met
in Damascus
for
two
days
to
discuss
the
establishment
of
a
new
security
system
for the
Per-
sian
Gulf.
On
6
March
1991
they
agreed
to
a
plan
which
came
to
be
called
the
Damascus
Declaration.
Under
this
plan,
Egypt
and
Syria
were
to
co-operate
with
the GCC
countries
to
provide
a
security
system
for the
Gulf.
Egypt
and
Syria,
which
already
had
military forces
numbering
over
70,000
in
the Gulf,
agreed
to
provide
the
military
personnel
required
while
the
GCC
coun-
Associate
Professor
of
Political Science,
Providence
College, Providence,
Rhode
Island.
An
earlier
version
of
this
paper
was
presented
at
the
seventy-first
annual
meeting
of
the
Southwestern
Social
Science
Association,
New
Orleans,
Louisi-
ana,
17-20
March
1993.
International
Journal
XLIX
SPRING
1994
220
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
tries
agreed
to
assume
financial
responsibility
for
the mainte-
nance
of
such forces.1
At
first,
the
scheme
set
out
in
the
Damascus
Declaration
was
quite
popular
in
many
Arab
capitals
as
well
as
in
Washington.
The
conservative
Arabs
hailed
the
plan
because
the
participants
were exclusively
Arab.2
Although
there
was
in
fact
no
consensus
among
American
policy-makers
and
area
specialists
on
a
pre-
ferred
security
system
for the Gulf,
in
the
last days
of
the
war
and
immediately
after
the
ceasefire
the
views
of
those
officials
and experts
who
preferred
a
regional
security
system
received
considerable
prominence
for
a
number
of
reasons.
3
First,
during
the
crisis
the
United
States
had
had
to
devote
considerable effort
to
keeping
Egypt
and
Syria
within
the
coa-
lition.
To
neutralize the
efforts
of
Iraq's
president,
Saddam
Hus-
sein,
to
portray the
Gulf
crisis
as
a
conflict
between
the
Americans
and
the
Arabs,
Washington
deliberately
encouraged
Cairo
and
Damascus
to
believe
that
they would
play
an
impor-
tant
role
in
Gulf
security
after
the
war.
Second,
the
United
States
was
concerned about
the
claim
of
radical
Arabs
that
its
inter-
vention
in
the Gulf
was
a
no
more
than
a
manifestation
of
Amer-
ican
imperialism
in
the
region.
It
believed
that
American
support
for
a
regional
security
system
would
cast
serious
doubt
on
the
validity
of
these accusations.
And,
third,
during
the
war
the
distribution
of
oil
wealth
in
the
Arab
world
became
a
major
issue.
Saddam
Hussein
as
well
as
many
American
Middle
i
New
York
Times,
7
and
12
March
1991;
'Terms
discussion positive,'
and
'Egyp-
tian,
Kuwaiti
ministers
comment,'
Foreign Broadcast
Information
Service,
Daily
Report,
Near
East
and
South
Asia
(hereafter
FBIS/NES),
6
March
1991,
2,
from
Damascus
Domestic
Service,
5
March
1991;
'Ministers
sign
declaration,'
FBIS/NES,
6
March
1991,
3,
from
Damascus
Domestic
Service,
6
March
1991;
and
'Abd-al-Majid
meets
with
counterparts
in
Syria,'
FBIS/
NES,
6
March
1991,
4,
from
Cairo
Domestic
Service,
5
March
1991.
2
See
'Bahrain
foreign
minister
comments
on Damascus
meeting,'
FBIS/NES,
8
March
1991,
i 1,
from
WAKH
(Manama),
7
March
1991,
and
'Ghali
on
Damascus
Declaration,
new
Arab
order,'
FBIS/NES,
26
March
1991,
4,
from
Middle
East
News
Agency
(hereafter
MENA),
23
March
1991.
3
See
remarks
by
President
George
Bush
in
New
York
Times,
7
March
1991,
and
by
the
defense
secretary,
Richard Cheney,
in
Defense
Issues
6(no.i
1,
1991),
3.
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