Seedbeds of insurgency
| Published date | 01 July 2014 |
| Author | J Craig Jenkins,Thomas V Maher,Chuck Fahrer |
| Date | 01 July 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343314523027 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Seedbeds of insurgency: Structure
and dynamics in the Egyptian
Islamist insurgency, 1986–99
J Craig Jenkins
Department of Sociology, Ohio State University
Thomas V Maher
Department of Sociology, Ohio State University
Chuck Fahrer
Department of History and Geography, Georgia College & State University
Abstract
Studies of insurgency and collective action are divided between structural and dynamic explanations. Structural
theories address the presence of insurgency while dynamic theories focus on the frequency of insurgent actions.
Yet prior studies often treat these arguments additively, leaving unclear how structural and dynamic processes
affect these different aspects of insurgency. This study addresses this division by using zero-inflated negative bino-
mial regression to examine in a single equation both the presence and the count of Islamist insurgency in Egyptian
governorates between 1986 and 1999. We test political economy, moral economy, and cultural clash explanations
of the presence of insurgency alongside political dynamics arguments about repression and exclusion to explain the
count of attacks. Looking at the structural side of this equation, we find that communities with high rates of pov-
erty, child mortality, cultural conservatism in terms of low contraceptive prevalence, and greater urba n density are
more likely to support insurgency. Looking at the dynamic side, parliamentary exclusion, security sweeps, and
executions affect the count of attacks along with spatial diffusion from neighboring governorates. The culturally
conservative region of Upper Egypt, which has a history of social and political marginality and opposition, pro-
vided a seedbed of insurgent support but this challenge broke down over time as repression intensified and exclu-
sion was relaxed. These findings underscore the point that the presence of and the intensity of insurgency are
distinct and driven by different factors. There are notable methodological and theoretical advantages to distin-
guishing between presence and count to better understand when and where insurgencies develop and their level
of collective action.
Keywords
conflict dynamics, insurgency, political violence, repression
Research on insurgency and collective action has long
been split between analyses of structural characteristics
of communities (Paige, 1975; Boswell & Dixon, 1990,
1993), dynamic models of dissent/repression (Almeida,
2003; Davenport, 2007), insurgent organizations
(Weinstein, 2007; Sageman, 2008), and micromobiliza-
tion (Opp & Roehl, 1990; Kalyvas, 2006). These argu-
ments have long coexisted in the field with minimal
dialogue partly due to difficulty in combining measures
of a complex phenomenon like insurgency. Second, dia-
logue has often been limited by a focus on different fea-
tures of insurgency.
Corresponding author:
Jenkins.12@sociology.osu.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2014, Vol. 51(4) 470–486
ªThe Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343314523027
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A key contention of this analysis is that structural and
dynamic arguments are about different features of insur-
gency.
1
Structural arguments are about how sociopolitical
contexts (e.g. poverty, community organization) make
insurgent organizing possible. What allows insurgents to
organize, that is, ‘for the fish to swim in the sea’ to para-
phrase Mao Zedong’s (1961: 93) metaphor for the rela-
tionship between revolutionary organizers and the
communities in which they operate? Hence the key issue
is the presence of insurgency. In the analysis below, we
examine political economy, cultural clash, and moral
economy arguments about insurgent presence. In con-
trast, dynamic arguments are about the intensity of
insurgent action. What drives the frequency of and sup-
port for insurgent action? In the analysis below, we
examine whether political repression and opportunities
influence the count of attacks. Our main contribution
is to show that these two outcomes – presence and
count – should be analyzed simultaneously in a way
that recognizes their distinctiveness.
Our second contribution is to show that cultural
conservatism contributed to the Islamist insurgency
that engulfed Egypt between 1986 and 1999. Discus-
sions of Islamist terrorism and insurgency have often
been framed in terms of how Muslim beliefs legitimize
violence and/or the clash of Islam with Western values
(Lewis, 1993; Huntington, 1996; Inglehart & Norris,
2002). Instead of such a cultural clash, we find that tra-
ditionalism as gauged by low contraceptive prevalence
created a receptive context for Islamist organizing. Over
85% of Egyptians are Muslim but it was culturally tra-
ditional communities that were most receptive to insur-
gent organizing. These communities were also poor,
disadvantaged, and concentrated in Upper Egypt,
2
which has led some to characterize this as a ‘regional
revolt’ (Fandy, 1993, 1994).
We test these arguments with a pooled cross-
sectional time-series analysis of governorate-level Isla-
mist attacks in Egypt between 1986 and 1999. Our
dataset includes 465 Islamist attacks of which over
61% targeted security forces and government officials,
resulting in 787 deaths. These attacks killed the head
of counterterrorism police, the speaker of the parlia-
ment, dozens of tourists, and over 100 Egyptian police,
and attempted to assassinate President Mubarak and
other top officials. This insurgency severely disrupted
Egypt’s tourism industry (nearly 15% of the economy)
and contributed to widespread political alienation that
led to the Arab Spring (Gerges, 2000; Fahrer, 2001a,b;
Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004). Due to inhospitable des-
ert terrain bracketing the Nile Valley, insurgents had to
operate largely in urban areas, which likely ensured a
tighter coupling between community support and
insurgent attacks than in most insurgencies. In terms
of explanations, we test dynamic arguments about how
political repression and parliamentary access shaped
the count of insurgent attacks while structural factors
and cultural conservatism affected the presence of
insurgency.
Islamist insurgency in Egypt
The Islamist insurgency that unfolded during the 1990s
was a product of a long history of Islamist and Egyptian
government contention. In the 1950s, President Nasser
instituted progressive land reform, education, and pub-
lic health policies while repressing Islamist opposition.
3
The policies were supported by most except conserva-
tive landowners, religious leaders, and the Muslim
Brotherhood (Faksh, 1997). Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s suc-
cessor, reversed many of Nasser’s financially unsustain-
able Arab-Socialist policies, angering leftist-Nasserists.
To counter leftist opposition and court Islamist sup-
port, Sadat adopted Islamic rhetoric, granted amnesty
to imprisoned Muslim Brothers, and supported Islamist
student movements. The Islamists consequently devel-
oped an organizational infrastructure of independent
mosques, campus groups, and community organiza-
tions delivering health care, schooling, and social insur-
ence (Ibrahim, 1980; Wickham, 2002). Despite Sadat’s
efforts, radical Islamist groups such as Tanzim al-Jihad
turned against him over the peace process with Israel,
hisneglectofUpperEgypt,andtheperceptionthat
he ‘lied all along about his desire to implement shari’a’
(Gerges, 2000: 602). Islamist opposition culminated in
Sadat’s assassination on 6 October 1981 by members of
Tanzim al-Jihad during a military parade. Signaling the
regional and antisecular hatred, the lead assassin
claimed, ‘I have killed the Pharaoh’ (Munson, 1988:
80). Hosni Mubarak – Sadat’s successor – quickly
deployed paratroopers to crush an insurrection in
1
Organizational strength and micro recruitment arguments also
deserve treatment but, due to data limitations, are not treated here.
2
We use Upper Egypt and Sa’id interchangeably in this analysis. The
Sa’id includes the governorates of Giza, al-Fayyum, Beni Suwayf,
al-Minya, Asyut, Suhaj, Qena, and Aswan (see Figure 1) (INP-E).
3
The government banned the Muslim Brotherhood and arrested
hundreds of Islamists, including Sayyid Qutb, who is notable for
inspiring contemporary militant political Islam (Esposito, 2002;
Sullivan & Abed-Kotob, 1999).
Jenkins et al. 471
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