Selecting Immigrants in an Unjust World
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321719833885 |
| Published date | 01 February 2020 |
| Author | Kevin KW Ip |
| Date | 01 February 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719833885
Political Studies
2020, Vol. 68(1) 128 –145
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321719833885
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Selecting Immigrants in
an Unjust World
Kevin KW Ip
Abstract
For many individuals living in poor societies, migration is the best hope for improving their life
prospect. However, global migration today is highly selective and stratified. Affluent states often
enjoy great discretion to cherry pick their immigration, favouring those with particular skills and
qualifications. In this article, I argue that this practice of selective immigration is morally permissible
only when a set of demanding conditions are met. I also argue that their right to exclude potential
immigrants is constrained by the background distributive injustice in the global context.
Keywords
immigration, the right to exclude, global distributive justice, duty of justice
Accepted: 25 January 2019
Introduction
‘Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free’. These are
the famous words from Emma Lazarus’s poem engraved on the pedestal of the Statue of
Liberty. The current situation of global migration obviously falls short of Lazarus’s
humanitarian vision as affluent states often enjoy great discretion to ‘cherry pick’ their
immigrants. Some political theorists argue (Carens, 1987, 2013; Cole, 2000; Oberman,
2016) that national borders should be open to potential migrants, while others maintain
(Miller, 2013, 2016; Wellman, 2008) that states should have the right to restrict immigra-
tion. In fact, global migration today is highly selective and stratified. States often grant
privileged admissions to potential migrants who can bring productive labour, marketable
talent, knowledge and innovation to their host society. In this article, I ask whether it is
morally permissible for states to select immigrants according to their expected economic
contributions. This practice is referred to as ‘economic selection’.
In the late nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick (1996 [1897]: 248; Cited in Miller,
2016: 5) argued that ‘a state must obviously have the right to admit aliens on its own
Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Corresponding author:
Kevin KW Ip, Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, AAB
1115, 11/F, Academic and Administration Building, Baptist University Road Campus, Hong Kong Baptist
University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.
Email: mr.kawai.ip@gmail.com
833885PSX0010.1177/0032321719833885Political StudiesIp
research-article2019
Article
Ip 129
terms, imposing any conditions on entrance or tolls on transit, and subjecting them to any
legal restriction or disabilities that it may deem expedient’. Sidgwick’s view would find
little support today, as it is now widely believed that selecting immigrants according to
their race or religious background is both discriminatory and indefensible. However, eco-
nomic selection appears to enjoy much greater support. David Miller (2016: 104–106),
for example, argues that as long as human rights are not at stake, the admission of eco-
nomic migrants should be understood in terms of mutual benefits, as both the receiving
state and the migrant should gain from such an arrangement. Even Joseph Carens, the
most prominent advocate of open borders, claims that economic selection in immigration
‘seems morally permissible’. Provided that states are morally entitled to control their own
borders,1 argues Carens (2013: 83–185), selecting immigrants according to their eco-
nomic potential would be ‘ungenerous’ but ‘not unjust’. In recent decades it has been
increasingly common for affluent states to select immigrants according to the applicants’
talents, professional qualifications or demand from the domestic market. These welcome
and wanted migrants include scientists, engineers, doctors and healthcare workers.
Canada, for example, has a Comprehensive Ranking System for economic migrants, in
which candidates are ranked according to their level of education, skills and work experi-
ence, and if they belong to in-demand occupations and language ability. The highest-
ranking candidates in the pool are invited to apply for permanent residence through an
‘Express Entry’ scheme (Government of Canada, n.d.). The case for poor low-skilled
migrants, however, is far more precarious. Even when some of these individuals eventu-
ally cross the borders into a developed country, they are often granted a much less secured
status (Heyman, 1998). They may become temporary workers or undocumented migrants
with no claim to social welfare or family reunification. These immigrants will also face
significant barriers in becoming full citizens.2
For many individuals who live in societies with limited job opportunities or economic
resources, migration is their best hope for improving their life prospects. This is so
because under the existing international order a person’s access to social and economic
advantages is largely determined by her place of residence, and transnational movement
of persons is heavily regulated by states. Branko Milanovic (2016: 118–139) finds that
80% of global inequality depends on a person’s place of residence and only 20% on social
class. People in the most affluent states enjoy ‘citizenship premium’ – benefits conferred
by their citizenship – simply by living in their current countries. At the same time, immi-
gration restrictions are coercively imposed on unwilling individuals (Abizadeh, 2008).
This article argues that economic selection in immigration is morally permissible only
when a set of demanding conditions are met. It proceeds as follows. Section ‘Market
Competition and the Ideal of Democratic Citizenship’ considers an objection to economic
selection, which states that citizenship should not be subject to market exchange and
argues that this objection is unfounded. Section ‘The Conditions for Selective Migration
to be Morally Permissible’ identifies the conditions that must be met for economic selec-
tion to be morally permissible. Section ‘Background Injustice and the Right to Exclude’
explains why background distributive injustice at the global level undermines the right of
affluent states to forcibly exclude potential migrants. Section ‘Objections and Replies’
responds to some possible objections to my arguments. The bulk of academic discussions
of immigration ethics has focused on whether borders should be open in principle, while
the problem of immigration selection has received relatively limited attention. The article
attempts to fill this gap in the literature by showing that a state’s right to exclude outsiders
is constrained by its responsibility for global justice.
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