Shifting Sovereignties
| Author | Iain McLean,Vernon Bogdanor |
| Date | 01 April 2010 |
| Published date | 01 April 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.2041-9066.2010.00012.x |
| Subject Matter | Debate |
either a Fleming or a Walloon. In this
case, the queen is the only person
in the United Kingdom who is not
specifi cally English, Welsh, Scottish
or Northern Irish, but both all and
none of these. She is in a better po-
sition than anyone else could be to
represent the nation to itself.
An elected head of state would
most probably be a retired politician.
Certainly no one could hope to be
elected who did not have the sup-
port of a large political party. Some-
one from ‘the great and the good’
without party allegiance – the late
Lord Franks was often mentioned as
a strong candidate for any would-be
British presidency – would have little
chance. A partisan fi gure would be
less trusted than a politically neutral
head of state to resolve the problems
that might arise with a hung parlia-
ment. But, even more importantly,
he or she would fi nd it diffi cult to act
as the representative of the whole
nation. Seeing Margaret Thatcher
or Roy Hattersley on the balcony
of Buckingham Palace on ceremo-
nial occasions would not have quite
the same resonance as is evoked by
Elizabeth II.
It would seem more diffi cult to
defend the continued existence of
an unelected upper house. Yet, curi-
ously enough, almost every democ-
racy with an elected upper house
is dissatisfi ed with it. Why is this?
The reason so many countries are
unhappy with their upper houses
is that there is a problem of a very
Debate
Shifting Sovereignties
Should the United Kingdom have an elected upper
house and elected head of state?
Democracy is a political system
in which those who hold
political power are elected
by, and accountable to, the people.
But, in Britain, neither the head of
state nor the upper house is elected.
Tony Benn once quipped that, of the
three elements of the legislature, the
Queen-in-Parliament, only one – the
House of Commons – was chosen by
the people. Nevertheless, both a he-
reditary monarchy and an appointed
House of Lords can be justifi ed with-
out doing violence to the democratic
principle.
In a modern constitutional mon-
archy, the head of state is neither a
political actor nor even an arbiter
between the parties. The queen’s
constitutional functions are residual
– to appoint a prime minister and
agree to a dissolution when sought
by her prime minister. These func-
tions are normally uncontentious,
though they may become conten-
tious when there is a hung parlia-
ment. The queen also sees the prime
minister for around an hour every
week when both are in London.
The queen’s role as head of govern-
ment is, however, far less important
than her role as head of the nation.
The central argument for constitu-
tional monarchy is that, under it, the
head of state is free from party ties,
and also without specifi c territorial
allegiance, so that she can represent
everyone in a multinational state. In
Belgium, it is often said that the king
is the only Belgian. Everyone else is
There is no contradiction between democracy and a hereditary monarch, writes Vernon
Bogdanor. And an unelected House of Lords is far more useful than an elected upper house
dominated by party apparatchiks.
fundamental kind in creating an up-
per house in a modern democracy,
especially in a non-federal state.
An upper house needs to be based
upon an alternative principle of
representation to that embodied in
the lower house. But what is that
principle to be? How can the same
electorate be represented in two dif-
ferent ways in two different houses?
The fi rst house, to which of course
a government in a parliamentary
regime is responsible, represents the
principle of individual representa-
tion. So what alternative principle
should the upper house represent?
In the 19th century, in a prede-
mocratic age, this was easy. Many
upper houses, including the House
of Lords, exemplifi ed the principle
of giving special representation to
hereditary right or to the landed in-
terest. But such a rationale is quite
unacceptable today.
The problem seems easier to
resolve in a federal state than in
a unitary one since an alternative
principle of representation in a
federal state immediately suggests
itself – the representation of terri-
tory. Britain, however, is very far
from being a federal state and, even
if it were, the problem would not
be resolved. For second chambers in
federal states – the United States be-
ing the prime exception – represent
less the interests of territory than
the interests of the political parties
that are strong in that territory. In
Australia, for example, the Senate
Almost every
democracy
with an elected
upper house
is dissatis ed
with it
11April 2010
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