Should Kids Pay Their Own Way?
| Author | Patrick Tomlin |
| Published date | 01 August 2015 |
| Date | 01 August 2015 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12111 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Should Kids Pay Their Own Way?
Patrick Tomlin
University of Reading
Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised in such a way that they are able to lead a minimally
decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children
are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers,
despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main
views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot
the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill
alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this article, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from
the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the
raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.
Keywords: children; distributive justice; principle of fair play
Children have a unique moral status. They are not full moral agents and have never been
full moral agents but, unlike other such beings (fish, for example), there are duties on at
least some of us to turn them into full moral agents. This is, at least in part, what it is to
raise a child. Raising children is an expensive business – they cost time and money, and lots
of both. They need clothes, shelter, food, teachers, health care and a great deal of
supervision, attention and effort.1Who should ultimately bear the costs of these things that
children are undoubtedly owed?
Despite (currently) being such a huge drain on both public and private finances, exactly
who should be picking up the tab for these proto-agents has received relatively little
attention from political philosophers. To the extent that there is a debate on this, two main
views can be identified.2One view identifies the group ‘parents’ as liable for the costs of
raising children.3I will call this view Parents Pay. The other view holds that (adult)
non-parents are liable for at least some of the costs, usually based on the notion that a next
generation is a benefit for all, and thus to allow parents to bear all the costs of raising
children would be the worst kind of free-riding. Parents are doing a job on behalf of us
all, and the non-parents should help them out with that. I will call this view Society Pays.4
Good arguments have been offered on behalf of, and against, both views. The central aim
of this article, however, is to question whether these two lines of argument exhaust the option
set. Are these the only bases on which we might be considered liable for the costs of raising
children – as the initiators of a child-rearing project or as the future beneficiaries of such
projects? I suggest not. I do this by introducing a potentially liable party missing from the
debate at present: children themselves. In this article I put forward some arguments suggesting
that children (upon reaching adulthood) should be considered liable for some of the costs of
raising children, on the basis that they themselves have benefited from being raised.
The article proceeds as follows. In the second section I clarify the topic and introduce
some assumptions. The restrictions these place on the immediate policy relevance of the
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doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12111
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2015 VOL 63, 663–678
© 2014 The Author. Political Studies © 2014 Political Studies Association
argument are noted. The third section introduces the Parents Pay and Society Pays views
in a little more detail. In the section entitled ‘Foisting Benefits on Children’ I begin to
mount the case for my view (called Kids Pay), noting how it relies on a similar principle
to Society Pays, namely the principle of fair play. I argue that the situation in which
children receive the goods of raising is one in which the principle of fair play is applicable.
In the two sections that follow that, I consider two putative restrictions on fair play
obligations, arguing that on the best understandings of these restrictions (and on certain
assumptions about what we do when we create children) Kids Pay survives. Finally I
consider and refute an objection to Kids Pay, which is that the theory has inegalitarian
consequences, because it seems to suggest that children who are expensive to raise must pay
more.
Some Assumptions and Clarifications
Before we proceed to the argument, some assumptions must be made explicit, and some
clarifications made. I assume throughout a just background distribution – that is, prior to the
question of children, everyone has what they justly should.5I also assume that (in normal
circumstances) children are owed or must have certain things that are essential for their
development. I am not here going to try to specify exactly what state it is that we must try
to get children to, or exactly what goods are necessary for them to get there. I will simply
say that they are owed the goods necessary for a minimally decent or acceptable life. Providing
these things constitutes the costs of raising children.6
In this article I am concerned with which agents are primarily liable for these costs – that
is, I am interested in whom the duty falls to first. Other agents (and in particular the state)
may have secondary duties – duties to step in when the primary duty bearer fails to
discharge their duty.7
It should be made clear that two of the above assumptions – the just background
distribution and the focus on primary duty bearers – heavily restrict this article in terms of
its immediate policy implications. There may be (and I believe there are) many good
reasons for state support for parents in the absence of the ideal conditions of the just
background distribution, and in the role of secondary duty bearer. In particular, in
contemporary societies there is an important gender dimension to all issues of childcare
which I do not even touch upon here, but which it would be impossible to ignore from
a policy point of view (Casal, 1999, p. 374).
Existing Views
Fred and Wilma: Fred and Wilma live next door to Barney and Betty. Both couples are
childless, and there is just distribution between them. Fred and Wilma decide to have a child,
and the beautiful Pebbles is born nine months later. Fred and Wilma’s lives change dramati-
cally. Pebbles must be cared for around the clock, and must be clothed, kept warm, fed and
so on, and these burdens fall on Fred and Wilma’s shoulders. Fred and Wilma’s free time and
income both drop dramatically, while their expenses rocket.
The question that confronts us here is: do Fred and Wilma have any right to assistance
(financial or otherwise) from anyone else, such as the childless Betty and Barney, or, against
664 PATRICK TOMLIN
© 2014 The Author. Political Studies © 2014 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2015, 63(3)
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