Should the Equality Act 2010 Be Extended to Prohibit Appearance Discrimination?
| Author | Andrew Mason,Francesca Minerva |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321720966480 |
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720966480
Political Studies
2022, Vol. 70(2) 425 –442
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321720966480
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Should the Equality Act 2010
Be Extended to Prohibit
Appearance Discrimination?
Andrew Mason1 and Francesca Minerva2
Abstract
The UK Equality Act 2010 prohibits direct and indirect discrimination with respect to nine
characteristics: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy
and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. We argue that the best way
of understanding the Act is to see it as protecting those who are vulnerable to systematic
disadvantage, partly in virtue of being at risk of experiencing discrimination that violates what
we call the meritocratic principle. If this is a key principle underpinning the Act, then there is
a compelling case for extending the legislation to include the protection of at least one further
characteristic, namely, appearance. We consider but reject various difficulties that might be raised
with extending the Act in this way, including the objection that those vulnerable to forms of
appearance discrimination that violate the meritocratic principle could be adequately protected
by treating them as disabled.
Keywords
equality act 2010, appearance, discrimination, meritocratic principle, disfigurement
Accepted: 21 September 2020
The UK Equality Act 2010
The UK Equality Act, which came into force in 2010, was designed to bring together vari-
ous pieces of anti-discrimination legislation into a single framework.1 It prohibits both
direct and indirect discrimination in relation to a specified set of protected characteristics.
But the legislative framework, and the guidance that the Equality and Human Rights
Commission (EHRC) provides for interpreting it, does not explain why this particular set
of characteristics is designated as protected, nor does it make explicit the moral basis of
the framework. Understanding the moral framework behind the Act is important for
assessing whether the legislation achieves its ends and for determining whether there
should be more protected characteristics than those designated.
1Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
2 Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK and Philosophy and
Moral Sciences, University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium
Corresponding author:
Andrew Mason, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK.
Email: a.mason@warwick.ac.uk
966480PSX0010.1177/0032321720966480Political StudiesMason and Minerva
research-article2020
Article
426 Political Studies 70(2)
We argue that there is at least one further characteristic that should be protected by the
legislation, namely, appearance. By a person’s appearance, we mean the physical attrib-
utes of his or her body and how it is adorned or modified that are perceivable by others
who possess the normal range of visual capacities together with relevant cultural knowl-
edge. Appearance includes attributes that we are born with (e.g. a cleft lip), attributes
that we have as a result of what happens to us (e.g. disfigurements that are the result of
accidents) and attributes that are a product of our choices (e.g. clothing, tattoos, pierc-
ings and hairstyles). Some of these attributes are such that they change of their own
accord over time or can be altered at will, whereas others are immutable or can be altered
only with great cost or difficulty (for instance, through strict dieting, demanding exer-
cise, or cosmetic surgery).
Appearance discrimination occurs when a person is treated better or worse on the
basis of one or more of these physical attributes, in virtue of the visual perceptions they
cause and the meaning or significance that is attached to them. In other words, it is dis-
crimination on the basis of a person’s looks, also known as ‘lookism’, a term that echoes
other (better known) forms of discrimination, such as racism, sexism or ableism
(Minerva, 2013). There is evidence that appearance discrimination is widespread and
affects various realms of life, including social interactions, health care assistance and
romantic relationships, as well as job opportunities and income. Numerous studies in
economics and psychology have shown that, across different cultures and geographic
areas, those regarded as attractive do better not only with respect to dating and social
interactions more generally, but also in the job market, that is, they are more likely to be
interviewed, hired and promoted (Maestripieri et al., 2017). As a result of these social
dynamics, people regarded as attractive earn significantly higher incomes on average
than those who are regarded as unattractive or as less attractive. In the United States, it
has been estimated that the ‘beauty premium’ for women with above average looks is
12% while for men it is 17%, when compared to the earnings of those of each sex with
below average looks (Hamermesh, 2011: 45–46).
But this evidence is not enough to demonstrate that people regarded as below average
looking are the victims of wrongful discrimination. Before we are entitled to reach that
conclusion, we need to know more about why they experience discrimination, and we
need an account of what makes discrimination wrong (when it is wrong) in order to assess
whether the discrimination they experience is morally permissible or not. But the best
data currently available raise the spectre, at least, that those regarded as unattractive, or as
less than averagely attractive, are the victims of wrongful discrimination and prompt the
question of whether, if they are, the Equality Act should be extended to include appear-
ance as a protected characteristic. Indeed, is there a case for treating as a protected char-
acteristic not only physical attributes over which people have limited control in virtue of
which they are judged to be attractive or unattractive, but also chosen features of appear-
ance that may disadvantage a person because they are regarded as unconventional, such
as tattoos, piercings and brightly coloured hair? It is these issues that we propose to
address.
The Normative Basis of the Act
The Equality Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of nine characteristics that are
described as ‘protected’: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil part-
nership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. It
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